ARMEN M. AIVAZIAN

The Armenian Rebellion of the 1720s and the Threat of Genocidal Reprisal

Center for Policy Analysis
American University of Armenia
Yerevan, Armenia
1997
Copyright © 1997
Center for Policy Analysis

American University of Armenia
40 Marshal Bagramian Street
Yerevan, 375019, Armenia

U.S. Office: 300 Lakeside Drive
Oakland, California 94612

This research was carried out in the Center for Policy Analysis at American University of Armenia supported in part by a grant from the Eurasia Foundation.

First Edition
Printed in Yerevan, Armenia
Contents

Acknowledgements.................................................................v
1. Introduction.................................................................1
2. Historical Background......................................................4
   The International Setting
   Armenian Self-Rule in Karabakh and Kapan and the Armenian Armed Forces
   The Traditional Military Units of the Karabakh and Kapan Meliks
   The Material Resources and Local Manufacture of Arms
   Armenian Military Personnel in Georgia
   Armenian Military Personnel in the Iranian Service
   The External Recognition of Armenian Self-Rule in Karabakh and Kapan
3. The Rise of Anti-Armenian Attitudes and Its Ramifications..........................21
   Preliminary Notes
I should like to express my deep appreciation to Professor Nikola Shahgaldian of the American University of Armenia, who guided the manuscript through the process of editing and publication. I owe to him a number of comments, criticisms, and insights. I wish to thank also Professor Levon Chorbajian of the University of Massachusetts and Academician M. G. Nersissian for their helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of this study. I appreciate the contribution of Associate Professor Lucig Danielian of the American University of Armenia, who made useful suggestions and corrections. I am also indebted to Virgil Strohmeyer, Matthew Der-Manuelian, and Tim Greenwood, who at different phases of this research kindly made themselves available to check my English. I am grateful to Vardan Mkhitarian, Fellow of the History Faculty, Yerevan State University, who generously assisted me in the preparation of the map.

This study was researched and written with the support of the Center for Policy Analysis at the American University of Armenia, where I was a Visiting Research Fellow for the 1996-97 academic year. This book would not have been possible without the generous support of the Center. Some aspects of the preliminary research took place while I was in the United States during the Fall of 1995 on a grant from the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), with funds provided by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. I remain, of course, solely responsible for the contents and conclusions.
TRANSCAUCASIA IN THE 1720s
INTRODUCTION

While studying the turbulent events of the 1720s in Iran, including the successive Afghan, Russian and Ottoman invasions, I repeatedly came across Armenian warnings of being, in their own words, "totally exterminated" by the Iranian and Ottoman Muslims. Most significantly, this anxiety was experienced throughout these states whether near the military front-line or far away to the rear in Tiflis, Rasht, Shamakhi, Karabakh, Constantinople, or Erzerum. What is interesting, moreover, is that while these primary sources reflect the varied personal backgrounds and social positions as well as divergent ideological and religious convictions of their Armenian authors, they all express their apprehensions in identical terms. This study intends to establish the basis of their anxiety: whether it was founded on a balanced assessment of regional developments and certain politico-cultural realities of the early modern Iranian and Ottoman Empires or whether perhaps it was merely a largely irrational mass sentiment. If the former proves to be correct we must ask what kind of social and intercommunal relations were then in place in these two empires and what were the differences, if any, between them.

These Armenian apprehensions are all the more intriguing in light of the prevailing Western academic views on the nature of early modern, pre-genocide Armeno-Turkish relations. To
summarize, this Western perspective assumes that “in the official [Ottoman] texts, and when compared with the Greeks and Macedonians, the Armenians were termed millet-i sadika, 'the loyal nation’,” a status which, as has been argued by some analysts, changed only in the late nineteenth century.¹

The ultimate question is whether there are any causal, ideological, sociopsychological or institutional parallels between the dynamics of the massacres and deportations of the 1720s and that of the Armenian Genocide of 1894-1923.

This study intends to provide specialists with both historical evidence and an analysis of Transcaucasian politics in the 1720s. However, an in-depth presentation of the pertinent historical circumstances is beyond our task. The focus here is on the most essential historical aspects -- those that can facilitate the further understanding of these documents on the rise of anti-Armenian attitudes. First, this study examines the rise of Armenian self-rule in Karabakh and Kapan in Eastern Armenia against the background of Transcaucasia's international setting in the 1720s, the previous military establishments of the Armenians, and the capacity of their armed forces in the 1720s and their successful resistance to Ottoman troops. These themes have been extremely underrepresented in English.² Second, the study traces the institutional, ideological, and psychological roots of the practice of extermination in the Ottoman state, the Armenian casualties, and the basic motives for the rise of anti-Armenian attitudes.

The majority of the original Russian and Armenian documents presented below have been translated into English by the author for the first time. These sources are kept in various archives in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Venice, Vienna, Yerevan, and elsewhere. For this study, however, the Archives of Foreign Policy of Russia (AVPR) in Moscow are the richest and most valuable. Although extensive portions of this evidence have already been
published (see List of Abbreviations), the research I carried out at AVPR during September-October 1991 clearly indicated that a plenitude of relevant material is still undiscovered and unexplored. Unfortunately, even the published documentation has been analyzed insufficiently, not least because of the multilingual, diverse, disjointed and therefore highly complicated character of the sources. These materials include miscellaneous letters including once-secret correspondence, which utilized equivocal or ciphered language and sometimes even deliberate misinformation, and scattered and often controversial glimpses of data contained in diploma-tic, military, and intelligence reports and in contemporary accounts of European, Russian, Persian, Turkish, Armenian, and Georgian authors. This study can serve as a useful pointer to the corpus of sources in the field; especially because the Armenian sources, both primary and secondary, are largely unknown in the West.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The International Setting

From 1722 to 1735 Safavid Iran underwent deep internal and external crises. In 1722 Afghan rebels overran much of central Iran, including its capital, Isfahan. The multiethnic populations of Transcaucasia and some other peripheral regions of Iran found themselves left without effective central and local administration as well as subject to increasing intercommunal strife and foreign intervention. The Afghan conquest and its repercussions wrought cataclysmic changes upon Iran, leading a perceptive Carmelite orientalist to describe the process as follows:

The break with the past [in the 1720s]... was, however, so complete that to it in more proximate or more remote degree may be ascribed most of the ills of the next two hundred years... In its soul as a nation, it was as if the country had raised round itself a wall of separation from the rest of the world, had elected to develop fanaticism, an intolerance, contempt and ostracism of the rest of the world which exercised their baneful effect well into the twentieth century.\(^3\)
This assessment, recorded in writing as early as 1939, is all the more thought-provoking in light of the recent developments of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the following institutionalization of the Islamic regime in Iran.

In August through October 1722 Russian troops, led by Peter the Great, invaded and for the first time occupied the Caspian littoral of what was then Iranian Transcaucasia. This constituted a historical turning point in Russian policy towards the Near East as well as a completely new strategic reality for the region. The new geopolitical setting that came to life in Transcaucasia (with Russia, Iran, and Turkey as competing regional 'superpowers') has remained strikingly close to its archetype up to the present.

In the years immediately preceding the 1722 'Persian Campaign' of Peter the Great, the Christian nations of Transcaucasia, the Armenians and Georgians, were secretly negotiating with Moscow for the latter's assistance in their bid for emancipation from Iranian rule. Hence, the Russian occupation of part of the Caspian coast, accompanied by Peter's promises to provide military support for their liberation attempt, created a real sense of euphoria among these peoples. In September, 1722, a combined Georgian-Armenian army of about 50,000, headed by Vakhtang VI, the king of Kartli (the Georgian principality within Iran), set out from Tiflis and camped near Ganja waiting for the promised advance of the Russians. It was promptly joined by 10,000 “crack and well-armed” fighting men from Karabakh, an Armenian-populated mountainous region. Both the Armenians and Georgians saw the Russian appearance in Transcaucasia as a sign of their long-awaited salvation from Muslim rule and the restoration of their independence. A few years later, Yesayi Hasan-Jalalian, the Catholicos (Spiritual Head) of the Armenians of Karabakh and a veteran of the Armenian liberation movement,
summarized the popular mood of those days with the words, “We thought that Armenian sovereignty had been reestablished.” Likewise, appealing to the united Armenian and Georgian troops, Vakhtang VI declared, "Henceforth be courageous and brave as the sons of the Almighty! And do not fear anything or anyone, since the time of the salvation for the Christians has now come.”

However, both the unfavorable international situation and the heavy Russian casualties suffered especially during the first stage of his ‘Persian campaign’ compelled Peter the Great to renege on his promises to the Transcaucasian Christians. Instead, he sought to consolidate the Russian hold on the Caspian coast and to expand it from Darband to Rasht, thus further securing his control over the northern route for the silk trade which, in fact, was the primary incentive and objective of his campaign. Furthermore, a Russo-Ottoman "partition" treaty, signed on 12 June 1724 in Constantinople, assigned all of Western Iran, including Eastern Armenia and Georgia, to the Ottoman Empire and the western and southern coasts of the Caspian Sea to Russia. The disheartening effect of this Russian policy on the Georgians and Armenians largely contributed to the first Ottoman military successes in Transcaucasia, in particular the capture in June, 1723, of the Georgian capital, Tiflis, without resistance. Georgian opposition to the Turks faltered further in July, 1724, when Vakhtang VI emigrated to Russia with his entire court and many high-ranking Georgian political and cultural figures (1200 men).

In contrast the Armenian armed forces, which were principally concentrated in the adjacent mountainous regions of Karabakh (ancient Artzakh, late medieval Khachen) and Kapan (ancient Siunik), did not follow this pattern. Although at first opposed to Iranian rule, after the Ottoman invasion of Iran, the Armenians succeeded in preserving their military capability, allied themselves with the Iranian forces without terminating their
relationship with the Russians, and maintained a fierce resistance to the Turks until the recapture of all of Transcaucasia by Iranian troops in 1735.

**Armenian Self-Rule in Karabakh and Kapan and the Armenian Armed Forces**

Both Armenian and non-Armenian sources reveal that in the 1720s Karabakh and Kapan alone had standing forces ranging from 30,000 to 60,000 soldiers. This powerful and seemingly sudden reemergence of the Armenian armed forces would have been impossible without the existence of Armenian military cadres and structures in the region. There were three main military formations around which the Armenian troops were newly organized: First, the military units of the Karabakh and Kapan Meliks (Armenian feudal lords), second, the Armenian military serving in Georgia, and, finally, the Armenian military in the Iranian service. Material resources in the region and local manufacture of arms were important factors in this development.

The traditional military units of the Karabakh and Kapan Meliks served as the primary basis for the raising of Armenian troops in the 1720s. In this respect one unique report by Parsadan Gorgijanidze (1626-1703), a well-informed seventeenth century Georgian chronicler who served in both the Georgian and Iranian courts, deserves special attention. He referred to 40,000 Karabakh Armenian "musketeers" who were ready to launch a liberation war as early as 1632. We may compare this report with the fact that exactly the same number (40,000) of Karabakh Armenian soldiers was repeatedly mentioned in the 1720s. It is
evident that Gorgijanidze's information reflected a previous historical reality; even if due to the contemporary adverse regional setting and understandable security reasons this reality was an underground or dormant capability. The Georgian author's earliest information about the equipment of the Karabakh Armenian forces in 1632 had likewise received its near-complete corroboration in the 1720s developments. Thus, according to a report by the Karabakh Armenian envoys to the Russian Court, dated 5 November 1724:

Their army's weapons are muskets and sabers; in addition, the horse-soldiers have pistols. Furthermore, they have sufficient powder and lead; those muskets, and powder, and lead are made by the Armenians themselves, since they possess the relevant ores in sufficient quantity. Yet, although they possess the copper and iron ores, they have no cannons, since they have no cannon-founders.21

On 16 August 1725, Ivan Karapet, the influential Armenian manufacturer from Russia who was sent by Peter the Great as his personal "envoy" (poslannik) to Karabakh and Kapan with an intelligence and diplomatic mission,22 reported back from an area where in Karabakh he saw --

...such combative fighters that could be found nowhere else in Iran but only here. Today they number 12,000 cavalrymen, all equipped with muskets and sabers. Besides, their foot-soldiers are so many that only God knows [their number], and all have muskets. Moreover, they make 10 muskets per day (i.e., 3,650 muskets per year). Also, they have copper and iron-works...23
On 21 October 1729 the commanders of the Karabakh Armenian army described their forces as follows:

1. The Armenian army is in four sections; its commanders are Avan-yuzbashi, Tarkhan, Abram, Ohan, Baghi and Avak, who have under their authority 30,000 soldiers; these are all soldiers -- not farmers or merchants....

2. Their own gunsmiths are locally making their weapons, namely: muskets, sabers, broadswords, daggers, and pistols....

3. ...In addition, they possess iron, copper, lead, and silver mines...

5. Although the Turks launched many full-scale offensives against them, they, the Armenians, up to the present moment, have managed to repel them with all their own forces available...

6. They (the Armenians) hope that, as soon as the Russian assistance arrives, the ranks of the Armenian troops will [again] reach a level of 50,000 men.25

The Material Resources and Local Manufacture of Arms

These reports, *inter alia*, reveal that for the period in question Armenian Karabakh and Kapan maintained a sophisticated system of weapons manufacture, which originated much earlier than the 1720s and even before 1632 when the fire-arms (musket)
equipment of Karabakh Armenian soldiers was first attested to by Parsadan Gorgijanidze. In this respect it is noteworthy that prior to their rebellion the Karabakh and Kapan Armenians had been importing the most advanced, European-made fire-arms in addition to producing arms locally. For example, in 1707 Israel Ori (1659-1709), the plenipotentiary representative of the Armenian clandestine liberation movement to the European and Russian courts, arranged the purchase and transportation from Amsterdam of arms and ammunition to a total value of between 15,000 and 20,000 roubles for the equipment of Armenian soldiers.\(^{26}\) Another contemporary Armenian liberation activist, without releasing the particulars, reports in his memoirs that before 1722 under the pretext of buying books he was actually purchasing "weapons for the soldiers."\(^{27}\) However, with the start of the rebellion the opportunity to organize such operations had been minimized; for example, on 16 June 1724 a Russian spy (an Armenian merchant) reported,

...in the last days of April [1724] in Tabriz, 30 Kapan Armenians were executed by order of the Shah, since they were buying powder and lead and transferring them to Kapan.\(^{28}\)

After the Ottoman invasion and occupation of much of Transcaucasia by 1725, supply became one of the most pressing problems facing the Armenian troops in Karabakh and Kapan because importing military equipment in any significant amounts was no longer possible. Although in the course of war thousands of pieces of fire-arms were captured from Ottoman troops, this equipment did not solve the problem. As in the case of the timely concentration of the experienced Armenian military personnel in Karabakh and Kapan (see below), one would expect the whole
process of the local manufacture of arms to have been activated and reorganized from the bottom up from at least 1719 onwards and further improved upon to meet the greatly increased needs of constant war. The three-step chain of this process clearly started with the exploitation of the relevant mines, then progressed to arms production in small arms factories (which were, most probably, located next to the mines), and culminated in the supply of this equipment to the army. No doubt there was a special delivery system in place.

Those famous copper, iron, lead, silver and other mines so often referred to by the Armenians had been exploited since ancient times in the districts known nowadays as Kelbajar (the original Armenian Karavachar, meaning literally a 'precious metal market'), Getabek, and Dashkesan (the original Armenian Karahat, meaning literally a 'precious metal mine'). The Armenians had exercised control over the same mines before the 1720s as well. Another intelligence report, written in 1699, noted, "...parce que dans l'Armenie il se trouve grosse quantité de belles mines de cuivre et de fer, que les Armeniens tiennent." Furthermore, the effective control of the Armenian armed forces over these mineral-rich regions throughout the 1720s enables us today to plot the north-western boundaries of Armenian self-rule, which at that time extended to the north and north-west beyond the boundaries of the present-day Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (see map on page 4 and endnote 143).

Other material resources indispensable for an enduring war were also available in Karabakh and Kapan. For example, the report of 21 October 1729, quoted above, notes also that:

The country under their control (i.e., Karabakh) produces
wheat, millet, silk, cotton. Grapes, and many other kinds of fruits are abundant....Additionally, they have good horses of Persian and Turkish as well as local stock in ample quantities....For meat supplies there were cows, sheep and all kinds of poultry in ample quantities. They also possess all kinds of woods (except pines) in sufficient quantities....if the [Russian] Emperor decides to send any number of reinforcements [to Karabakh], they, the Armenians, would supply them with the bread, meat, butter, vodka, red wine (qixir6), and forage for the horses...33

Thus, the Armenian self-rule in Karabakh and, to a lesser degree, in Kapan was assisted by their agricultural and mineral self-sufficiency.

Armenian Military Personnel in Georgia

In the 1720s the Armenian troops were additionally manned by professional cadres from the Georgian military. In the 17-18th centuries, thousands of Armenian commanders and soldiers served in the ranks of the Georgian cavalry stationed both in Georgia proper and in Iran. For example, according to Joseph Emin (1726-1809), a central figure in the Armenian liberation movement in the 1760s-1780s, half of the Georgian trained military personnel in the 1760s consisted of Armenians.34 The situation was probably much the same in the 1720s. When describing the large mobilization campaign organized by Vakhtang VI in Georgia during August, 1722, Yesayi Hasan-Jalalian, an eyewitness and participant in these events, suggests an equal division "consisting of [both] Georgian and Armenian nationalities."35 At some time during the first days of September, 1722, Vakhtang allowed a 2,000-strong
all-Armenian division to separate from his 50,000-man army, which was heading for Ganja and to march under the command of his gifted Armenian general Davit-bek into Armenia, toward Kapan. These experienced and competent Armenian warriors from Georgia constituted the bulk of the Kapan Armenian military elite in the 1720s. Interestingly, Vakhtang himself greatly trusted his Armenian soldiers, especially those of Tiflis.

**Armenian Military Personnel in the Iranian Service**

The third component of the Armenian professional military constituted many hundreds of Armenian musketeers, who served in the detachments of the Shia Iranian rulers of Yerevan and Shamakhi and probably elsewhere in Eastern Armenia. Some of the Armenians reached the highest military positions in Iran. One of them was Allahverdi-khan, the renowned Iranian commander-in-chief during the reign of Abbas the Great (1587-1629); as quoted, for example, in the 22 April 1619 letter by Piedro Della Valle, the famous Italian traveller, Allahverdi-khan was a "[renegade] Christian Armenian by race, but of the country of the Georgians." The military tradition was maintained among the non-Muslimized Armenian émigrés in Iran as well. One of them, born in Hamadan in the beginning of the 17th century, as reported by his great-grandson,

*When a proper age, followed the profession of his forefathers, enlisting himself in the military service...and by dint of courage distinguished himself in two extraordinary actions.... He was consequently promoted to the honourable*
From 1722 to 1735 a considerable number of Armenian soldiers fought against the Ottoman troops in the ranks of the Iranian army. The very important participation of the Armenian forces on the Iranian side in the decisive battle of 8 July 1735 at Yeghvard plain located north of Yerevan, where the Ottoman army was totally destroyed and driven out from Transcaucasia, is well attested in Persian and Armenian sources. However, the earlier and similarly outstanding contribution of the Armenians in 1724 is almost unrecognized. In fact, several European sources ascribe a major share in the Tabriz victory of September 1724 to the Armenians. Thus, Judasz Tadeusz Krusinski (1675-1756), a prominent Polish Jesuit, who was in Isfahan until June, 1725, writes:

Happily for Prince Thamas, he had just put an end to the domestic dissentions among his party, and by his mild behaviour gained over those whom his unseasonable pride had disgusted; especially the Armenians of the mountains of Capan, who by joining him, put him in a condition, not only to make head against the Turks, but also to attack them in their intrenchments (sic): which he did, and with so much vigour, that he obtained one of the most glorious and compleat (sic) victories that had been known since the beginning of the Persian troubles, for there were 20,000 Turks slain in the battle [of Tabriz] and almost as many taken prisoners.

Elsewhere, Krusinski adds that during the Tabriz affair "the Armenians spared none" from the Ottoman elite Janizaries.
guard. The Turks dared to besiege Tabriz for the second time (in 1725) only after receiving the information that they [the Armenians] would not participate [in its defence].

Later, in 1754 Pilibek Basaurov, a distinguished Armenian commander of the 1720s, recalled the destruction of the 17,000-strong Turkish army by an Armenian mounted force "near Ararat" sometime in 1723-1724. This could have well referred to the same Tabriz affair, since no other similar encounter happened nearby at that time.

Between 1722 and 1725, one of the chief officers in the troops of Shah Tahmasb II (1722-1732) was Parsadan-bek, an Armenian of Tiflis, who commanded, as underlined by the quoted source, "in the rank of gedalibek, the best detachment, constituted of 300 Georgians." No doubt, these 300 soldiers included also the Armenians of Georgia (we know of two of Parsadan-bek's sons, Rafael and Taghi, who accompanied him). Another contemporary source specially clarified that the Armenians from Georgia "were called Georgians because they were from the country of Georgians, and not because they belonged to that nation." The participation of Parsadan-bek, with his "best detachment" in the Tabriz battle is highly probable.

Parsadan-bek was the father-in-law of Davit-bek, the leader of Armenian principality of Kapan between 1722 and 1728. Another of Parsadan's sons, Abdulmaseh, as a commander of a detachment joined the aforementioned 2,000-strong Armenian division which entered Armenia in September 1722. Abdulmaseh fought against the Iranian and Ottoman forces and was killed in action in Kapan.
some time between 1726 and 1728.\textsuperscript{51} Furthermore, Parsadan-bek himself was deeply engaged in the confidential preparations for the Georgian-Armenian rebellion as early as 1718 when he was authorized by Vakhtang VI to conduct top secret negotiations in Isfahan, Rasht and Shamakhi with Artemiy Volinskiy, the Russian ambassador to Iran from 1715 to 1718.\textsuperscript{52} The presence of Parsadan-bek in the army of Tahmasb during the ascent of Armenian rebellion could be best explained in terms of providing the Armenians with a kind of justification in the eyes of the Iranians. Accordingly, the Armenians, who were badly mistreated at the hands of the Iranian administrators in Eastern Armenia, approached Parsadan-bek in his capacity as a person close to Shah Tahmasb for assistance. At least once he managed to obtain a special decree (\textit{ragham}) from Tahmasb calling a halt to the terror against the Armenians launched in Yerevan in the summer of 1723.\textsuperscript{53} Simultaneously, a similar decree was obtained for the Armenians of Nakhichevan province. Although in the latter case the source does not explicitly state the names (except one) of all of the (as he indicated) several Armenian solicitors,\textsuperscript{54} the participation of Parsadan-bek in this episode is apparent as well.

Further, a contemporary source mentions by name five Christian Armenian commanders of the Iranian army in the late 1720s who were in charge of 500 soldiers. Reference is also made about the birth-places of four of them; one came from the city of Gori in Georgia, two others were from the village of Chapni in Kapan, and the fourth was from the village of Sod (today's Zod) of the Gegharkuni district, situated to the west of Karabakh on the eastern and south-eastern coast of the lake Sevan (in the 1720s Gegharkuni was fully within the political-military orbit of Armenian self-rule).\textsuperscript{55} As a matter of fact, the Armenian military units in Georgia and Armenia, particularly in Kapan, Karabakh, and Gegharkuni, constituted part of the Iranian armed forces. It is obvious that the Iranian army had been regularly enlisting the
Armenians precisely from those districts where the Armenian martial tradition was still in place. In turn, the service of Armenians in the larger Iranian units helped to maintain the effectiveness and considerable potential of the local Armenian forces insofar that as a rule the Armenian soldiers intermittently and eventually came back to reside in their native towns or villages where they enjoyed the high social status of noblemen.

In 1719 the Armenian military commanders serving in Shamakhi, headed by the famous Avan-yuzbashi (ca. 1670-1735) who between 1722-1728 was commander-in-chief of the Karabakh Armenian troops, were secretly invited and moved to Karabakh in order to supervise the re-organization, re-equipment, and training of the local forces in advance of the planned Armenian rebellion.56

By 1722, the concentration of Armenian military professionals in Karabakh and Kapan brought about a high level of combat preparedness in the local forces and had a large part to play in their later outstanding performance.57 Thus, although rarely visible on the historical arena during the 16th and 17th centuries, the Eastern Armenian military forces provided a suitable and sufficient basis to effect the speedy recovery for larger armies fighting with an agenda of nationwide liberation in the 1720s.

From 1722 to 1724, in addition to those forces in Karabakh and Kapan, Armenians formed military units in Yerevan where overall 10,189 Armenian fighting men participated in the 1724 defense of this "capital of Armenia".58 Similar units were formed in Nakhichevan, Gegharkuni, Ganja and some other locations.59 A few hundred Armenians formed the so-called Armenian Squadron within the Russian Contingent on the Caspian coast in the hope that the Russians would make headway towards Armenia.60

However, by the end of 1725 the Ottoman armies had seized almost all of Transcaucasia forcing the Armenians to confine their
resistance within the boundaries of Karabakh and Kapan. Nevertheless, these two adjacent and virtually independent Armenian regions proved to be the major centers of resistance to the Ottoman occupation of Transcaucasia from 1725 until 1735. Karabakh and Kapan's prolonged resistance without external support was organized perfectly, concentrating upon the provision of an all-round defense which entailed the enhancement of natural obstacles including control of mountain passes. The Ottoman armies did not succeed in subjugating these two collaborating regions despite imposing a total blockade from the beginning of 1726. Clearly, the Karabakh and Kapan Armenian troops posed a frustrating challenge to the Ottoman military and political leadership.

The External Recognition of Armenian Self-Rule in Karabakh and Kapan

Most interestingly, from 1722 to the 1730s the external powers (as well as the Armenians themselves) referred to Karabakh and Kapan by new terms which were absolutely different from their previous geographic and administrative definitions, namely -- Segnakh(s) or Armenian Segnakh(s) (Segnakh signified a fortified mountain area characterized by mutually supporting defensive works and fortresses), Armenian Assembly (Sobranie Arm[nskoe], Armenian Army (Arm[nskoe Vojsko or Armi[, and even Assembly of the Armenian Army (Sobranie Arm[nskogo Vojska). On 14 September 1733, Pavel P. Shafirov (1669-1739), a distinguished Russian diplomat, defined the region as:
...Armenia Minor which is now called Armenian Seghnaaks; all those lands are populated by brave Armenian Christians, who have defended themselves with their own forces against both the Turks and the Persians for [the last] several years.  

A well-known narrative by Jonas Hanway goes as far as to define the emergent Armenian autonomous areas as "a kind of republic." The appearance of these new designations amounts to the de facto recognition of Karabakh and Kapan's actual decade-long independence.

The upsurge of anti-Armenian attitudes in Iran and the Ottoman Empire and its ramifications will be the subject of further study throughout the remainder of this book. However, one indispensable aspect of the historical background, that of the course of Armenian resistance to the invading Ottoman armies, remains to be presented in some detail. A table of major battles between the Armenians and Ottoman regular troops during only four years from 1723 to 1727 is detailed below and presents the Armenian resistance and Ottoman casualties. These casualties, as we shall see later, actively fueled anti-Armenian passions in the ruling circles of the Ottoman Empire during the same period. The table clearly indicates the Ottoman losses (the question of the Armenian losses will be returned to later). It is important to note that many minor encounters with documented casualties of less than one hundred killed as well as those major encounters between the Armenians of Karabakh-Kapan and the Ottoman Turks which occurred from 1728 to 1734 have been omitted because the documents under consideration below are dated and refer to the period 1722-1727. The table is based on my crosschecked analysis of the data in the various Armenian, Russian, European, Iranian, and Turkish primary sources.
## TABLE 1
Major Battles between Armenian and Ottoman Forces
(1723-1727)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATES</th>
<th>SITES</th>
<th>OTTOMAN CASUALTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) 1723, Oct.</td>
<td>Ganja</td>
<td>7,000-9,000&lt;sup&gt;69&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) 1724, June-Sept.</td>
<td>Yerevan</td>
<td>20,000&lt;sup&gt;70&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) 1724, Sept.</td>
<td>Tabriz</td>
<td>20,000&lt;sup&gt;71&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) 1725, 3-4 March</td>
<td>Karabakh (Varanda)</td>
<td>4,700&lt;sup&gt;72&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) 1725, April</td>
<td>Kapan</td>
<td>over 100&lt;sup&gt;73&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) 1725, August</td>
<td>Karabakh</td>
<td>6,000&lt;sup&gt;74&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) 1726, March</td>
<td>Kapan (Jermuk)</td>
<td>over 100&lt;sup&gt;75&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) 1726, June</td>
<td>Karabakh</td>
<td>over 100&lt;sup&gt;76&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) 1726, 15-23 Nov.</td>
<td>Karabakh (Shushi)</td>
<td>800&lt;sup&gt;77&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) 1727, 26 Feb.-5 Mar.</td>
<td>Kapan (Halidzor)</td>
<td>13,000&lt;sup&gt;78&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) 1727, March</td>
<td>Kapan (Meghri)</td>
<td>over 1,000&lt;sup&gt;79&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) 1727, April</td>
<td>Karabakh</td>
<td>7,000&lt;sup&gt;80&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13) 1727, Summer</td>
<td>Kapan (Ordubad)</td>
<td>300&lt;sup&gt;81&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3
THE RISE OF ANTI-ARMENIAN ATTITUDES
AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS

Preliminary Notes

Hitherto Armenian Genocide studies have been primarily conducted within the context of the period between 1870 and 1923. The deeper chronological retrospective has been completely rejected on the grounds that genocide, in the modern use of the term, is thought of as an offspring of later ideologies of racism and nationalism and in the Armenian case especially of pan-Turkism. However, for states that later perpetrated full-scale genocides, the dismissal of their previous practice of extermination is more than ahistorical. The earlier bureaucratic, administrative, and military traditions of such states and especially their habitual treatment of minorities, rebels, and newly conquered populations merits careful examination. These traditional policies could have contributed to the development of later sophisticated genocidal ideologies by at a minimum providing ready intellectual, behavioral and decision-making models for operations on extermination and at a maximum by being simply revitalized and adjusted for employment in a changed historical context.
Two aspects related to the social and sociopsychological background of the Armenian Genocide of 1894-1923 particularly relevant to our topic have been emphasized by analysts. First, “the dynamic of the genocidal process at the level of the masses,”\textsuperscript{82} or as Vahakn Dadrian, the leading expert on the dynamics of the Armenian Genocide, posed it earlier in the form of the question “what possible social and psychological conditions could have led these individuals (i.e., Turkish villagers) to rise up in great numbers, and through concerted actions to exterminate their neighbors?”\textsuperscript{83}

Second, as Dadrian observed, during the 1894-1896 and 1909 Armenian massacres “there is a discernible Ottoman-Turkish pattern where resort to wholesale massacres emerges as an integral part of a policy respecting the treatment of minorities considered to be discordant and troublesome for the state.”\textsuperscript{84}

Clearly, the type of deeper chronological retrospective offered in this study provides us with new insights into the genesis of later genocidal policies in the Ottoman Empire.

Documents

The most expedient way to continue this study is to read the documentary information on Armenian apprehensions of the 1720s. In the following seven documents excerpts are taken from those letters, reports, and memoirs which most directly express this Armenian anxiety of being totally exterminated. The most explicit passages are presented in bold face followed by the original Armenian or Russian wording.
Document 1

Type: A letter on the developments in Iran, Armenia, and Georgia.  

Author: Minas Pervazian (1680-1757), Archbishop, Locum-Tenens of the Patriarch of All Armenians, the Prelate of the Armenians in North-Eastern Armenia and all Georgia.

Addressee: Minas Tigranian (1658-1740), Archbishop, from 1711 plenipotentiary representative of the clandestine Armenian liberation movement to the Russian Court; in 1716 was appointed Prelate of the Armenians in Russia.

Where written: Tiflis (Tbilisi), capital of the Georgian Kartli principality within the Iranian Empire

Date: 12 December 1722

The excerpt reads:

...Oh Vardapet (i.e., doctor of divinity), for God’s sake and as a token of your love toward the crucified Christ, act [so that] the King (i.e., Peter the Great) soon arrives in Shamakhi. As soon as he sets foot there, his name will be sufficient for 100,000 Armenian-race soldiers to gather round his feet. But if you are late and do not arrive there by March, our nation will be exterminated and the faith of the Illuminator will be extirpated (ղեկ ապար պատգամ հայկական զինվոր զմանվում պատգամ հայեր)...

[so] may the king come to Shamakhi soon, [otherwise, as] we and the Muslims know well, Armenia will be utterly destroyed (թռչն եզակիություն զգալիություն), if you continue to delay any more and do not hasten to our assistance....
Document 2

Type: A situation report covering the events in Iran, the Ottoman Empire, and Transcaucasia from 20 February 1722 to 22 August 1723. 

Author: Petros di Sarkis Gilanentz; before 1722 took an important part in clandestine Armenian liberation activities; Captain of the all-volunteer Armenian Squadron (Arm[nskij] 7skadron) set up at his and his companions' expense in 1723 within the Caspian Contingent of the Russian military; killed in action near Rasht in 1724. 

Addressee: Archbishop Minas Tigranian

Where written: Rasht (Iran)

Date: 22 August 1723

The excerpt reads:

...It is said that our Armenian mobilized soldiery consists of 60,000 men in three corps, and is quartered in three [fortified] areas... Your Grace must think of and care for them, since all Iranian Shiites and Ottoman Turks are after their blood and because of them (i.e., because of the Armenian rebels) the Armenians now suffer everywhere (թափ ծավալները ւ Օմիրմիութե մուգ թառքին ունենք այն ու մուգ արաքաշից ամենահարցան աուդե)։ Believe me that the reasons for the [current] devastation of Armenia are as follows: first, they say that 'the Armenians have to be totally massacred (ապսարակ ու թափ ծավաթ մտած տանում), since they are responsible for the devastation of this country by bringing the Russians into Iran, by inviting the
Afghans into Isfahan, and, over and above, 60,000 militant Armenians have assembled to join the Russians in order to destroy us. Alas, our name has become notorious throughout Iranian and Ottoman states: they allege that those Armenians vowed loyalty to the Russian king and are sucking our blood. If -- God forbid -- you don’t find a solution by obtaining an appropriate [Russian imperial] decree [to assist the Armenians militarily], henceforth we will not be able to live in this country (i.e., in Iran), and, if caught, we will be killed like dogs rather than like men; so we will be forced to wander around in the country of the Russians.

Document 3

Type: A letter on the recent developments in Transcaucasia.

Authors: Yesayi Hasan-Jalalian (?-1728), Catholicos and political leader of the Karabakh Armenians, with his See in Gandzasar monastery; Avan-yuzbashi and eight other field commanders.

Addressee: Peter the Great, the Russian Emperor

Where written: Karabakh (most probably, Gandzasar monastery)

Date: 1 November 1723

The excerpt reads:

...Now, if within one or two months no commander and troops under Your authority comes [to help us], Your Lordship could be certain that the enemies of Christ's Cross would exterminate us as a nation (qûhqw
...and, you will be held responsible by the Lord for our blood.

NOTE. Though written at different times, three later appeals from Karabakh to Moscow, written mainly by the same persons, reiterated this fear: (a) On 18 October 1724, in a message to Peter the Great, they wrote: "...indeed, within the next two or three months they (i.e., the Turkish troops) will capture us, and massacre, and annihilate this Christian nation altogether (Гре-мвяти тямъцът вятърът и тъ̀рение и пушъ̀те пръ̀сътъвът охъ̀рътъ свободна.) You are the only hope for our salvation."97

(b) On 10 March 1725, in a message to Vakhtang VI and his son Shahnaz-khan, who at that time were working at the Russian Court to obtain promised military assistance,98 they wrote: "...This is the day for help and support. If we do not receive support from there (i.e., from the Russian troops on the Caspian coast) within one or two months, our Christian nation will be altogether annihilated [by the attacking Turkish troops] (пушъ̀тъ пръ̀сътъвът охъ̀рътъ свободна.) What will be the use of all your [hard] efforts then?"99

(c) A slight paraphrase of the same apprehension could be found also in their message to Peter the Great of 10 March 1725: "...they will altogether annihilate our Christian Armenian nation (пушъ̀тъ пръ̀сътъвът охъ̀рътъ свободна.)"100

Document 4

Type: A letter on the recent developments in the Transcaucasus and Iran.101
Author: Martiros (dates of birth and death are unknown), Bishop, Father Superior of the Meysari Armenian monastery

Addressee: the Russian commandant of Darband

Where written: Meysari monastery (half a kilometer from Shamakhi)\(^{102}\)

Date: 24 February 1724

The excerpt reads:

...more than once they [the Ottoman Turks and their Sunni Caucasian allies] wanted to massacre the Armenians and Ghajars (i.e., local Shia Muslims),\(^{103}\) but were prevented [from doing so] by the akhunds [here -- the Sunni Muslim clergy]\(^{104}\). We are in great trouble: if not today, then tomorrow they will massacre us. For Our Lady’s sake, save us from their hands (քաղաքի առաջադիմություններ, այլորի դիմաքների ծխատու, երբ պահանջում է այս կենսագրական ճնշել սեր, որենք իրենց կողմից մամաւու, երբ պահանջում է այս կենսագրական) ....As soon as [Turkish] couriers reached Surkhay,\(^{105}\) it was again decided to massacre the Armenians (տուրքերի ճնշել է մամաւու四川省, երբ քաղաքի առաջադիմություններ)....If not today, then tomorrow they will massacre us...

NOTE. Even more specifc was the rendering of this letter into Russian made on 21 April 1724 in Moscow by another Armenian political figure, Luka Ilyin (Shirvanov)\(^{106}\). "[the Turks] instructed Surkhay to try to massacre the Armenians altogether...since it is the Turkish intent to eradicate us all (պաստերը սովորեն սպառնալը, երբ քաղաքի առաջադիմություն)....As soon as [Turkish] couriers reached Surkhay, \(^{107}\) it was again decided to massacre the Armenians (տուրքերի ճնշել է մամաւ, երբ քաղաքի առաջադիմություն)....If not today, then tomorrow they will massacre us..."
Document 5

The type, author, addressee, and place of composition are the same as Document 4.\textsuperscript{108}

Date: 6 March 1724

The excerpt reads:

The Turks constantly talk [to us] as follows: 'You, vile giaurs (infidels), are happy that the bastard Russians are coming, right? \textbf{Therefore we will so [completely] massacre you that you will not see their face.' Each and every day they deliberate on how to massacre the Armenians (Անելի ունենենք, ըստ եվրոպացի հարցման: երբեմն որ, ավելի օր ամբողջություն եկան, որ համեր պատերեն).}

Document 6

Type: A memorandum on the activities of the Armenian Catholics in Constantinople (Istanbul)

Author: Yeghia Vardapet Martirosian of Constantinople (1665-1757),\textsuperscript{109} Friar of the Mekhitarist (Armenian Benedictine) Congregation

Addressee: Mekhitar Sebastatsi (1676-1749), Abbot General, the Island of San Lazzaro, Venice\textsuperscript{110}

Where written: Galata, Istanbul

Date: 9 March 1725

The excerpt reads:
...the king [i.e., Sultan Ahmed III], being extremely troubled with the Armenians because of [the] Persian events, has many times ordered the total extermination of the Armenians; however, the mufti did not [agree to] issue an order to exterminate the Armenians. The [Istanbul Armenian] Patriarch is cognizant that, because of the Seghnakh Armenians, the chief rulers of this country are wrathful [against all Armenians] and call them 'disloyal.' He knows that as soon as he launches a campaign for the detention of the [Armenian] Catholics, the wounds of the king will be reopened and he would assume that local Armenians are also rebellious... that is why and for other hidden motives (sic) he does not attempt to have anyone arrested [from the Armenian Catholics] (mufti or Shaykh Al-Islam was an Ottoman legal authority appointed by the Sultan and vested with the exclusive right to issue a ruling (fatwa) related to the major provisions of Islamic law. The mufti was at that time a full 'member' of the Ottoman government, though "guided by the ministers' inclinations, to which he always rendered obedience." NOTE 2. From the second half of the seventeenth century the relations between the Armenian and Catholic Churches sharply deteriorated, giving rise to such events as the abduction and
detention in the Bastille of the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople (1706) and persecutions of Armenian Catholics especially in Istanbul.\textsuperscript{115}

**Document 7**

**Type:** Memoirs

**Author:** Yeghia Astvatzaturian Musheghian (1689-1750?), a Deputy to the Director of the English East India Company Tabriz Office in 1718-1723; in 1723, for a brief period, appointed French Consul in Mashad (Iran); participant in clandestine Armenian liberation activities from the 1710s to 1724. In 1724 he was sent by the Iranian Court to European states on a diplomatic mission.\textsuperscript{116} However, on his way through Russia he was denounced by his Catholic companion, mistakenly accused of spying, and imprisoned in Russia from 1724 to 1736. In 1745, after a long journey through Europe to Iran, he returned to his native Karin (Erzerum).\textsuperscript{117}

**Addressee:** Armenian youth and future generations\textsuperscript{118}

**Where written:** Karin (Erzerum)

**Date:** 1747-1749

**The excerpt reads:**

... having heard all this [i.e., allegations that Julfa Armenians collaborated with the Afghans, cf. Doc. 2 above], the Persians' envy and hatred [towards the Armenians] increased\textsuperscript{119} to the extent that they wished totally to massacre and exterminate every single Armenian; they
wanted [to perpetrate] that [intent] on many occasions, but
did not succeed, since God has saved them (i.e., the
Armenians) till the present day and will save them!

(հատուկ քայլի առաջարկում էր ու բազմաթիվ ազդեցություն եղել,
որ պայքարի համար, բայց այն գործիչների կազմը, որոնց
երկհարթում էր ամեն տարի, այդ երգեցմունքը քանի տեղ
էր այդ տարին ինչպես) 120
In 1722-1723 anti-Armenian passions were aroused in Iran, pre-dating such events in the Ottoman Empire. The major reason for this was the powerful liberation struggle launched in Eastern Armenia in 1722. Muhammad Kazim, the official historian of the famous Iranian ruler Nadir (1688-1747), relates that as soon as Tahmasb II (1722-1732) was crowned as the new Shah of Iran in Qazvin, northern Iran, the Iranian officials of Transcaucasia had rushed to warn him first about the rapid expansion of the Armenian rebellion which was already "threatening the fall of Ganja and Yerevan... [so that] if the [military] assistance does not arrive within a few days, the rebellion of this nation could not be stopped any more." Therefore the first decision of Shah Tahmasb II was to organize a punitive expedition against the Armenians, although this did not get beyond the preparation stage.\textsuperscript{121} This plan was to have been enacted in November 1722.\textsuperscript{122} During 1722-1724 intense hostilities took place between Iranian and Armenian troops in Kapan and Nakhichevan.\textsuperscript{123}

The Iranians' allegations that the Armenians of New Julfa (a city neighboring Isfahan and inhabited exclusively by Armenians)\textsuperscript{124} collaborated with the Afghans supply a classic scapegoating explanation for the Iranians' rage against the Julfa Armenians. Krusinski, an eyewitness to the Afghan capture of Isfahan, strongly and in detail defends the Armenians against this what he calls "pretended infidelity."\textsuperscript{125} His following statements in particular support and clarify the reports by Musheghian and Gilanentz (see documents 2 and 7 above):
Though the [Persian] Court's abandoning the [Armenian] City of Zulfa (Julfa), notwithstanding the repeated instances that were made for assistance; and the cruel treatment the citizens [of Julfa] had met with from the rebels, was enough to vindicate their fidelity [to the Shah]; yet they were looked upon as traitors, who held intelligence with the rebels, and had delivered their city to them; and it is incredible how the Persians were enraged against them for this pretended infidelity.\textsuperscript{126}

Stating that "nothing however was more unjust than this reproach" and dwelling on the real story of the fall of Isfahan,\textsuperscript{127} Krusinski sums up the reasons why the Armenians of Julfa refused to mediate between the Afghans and Persian Court (space does not permit Krusinski's entire account):

They knew how much the Court and city of Isfahan were set against them; that nothing less was talked of there than the destruction of their city (i.e., Julfa) by fire and sword, as soon as the rebels were gone. That the very women talked so in the markets, loading them with curses, and threatening to tear the Armenian children out of their mothers' bellies...and if ever the latter (i.e., the Persians) should again be masters, the Armenians have nothing to think of but quitting the kingdom...\textsuperscript{128}

In the preceding almost two and a half centuries of Safavid Iranian rule in Eastern Armenia, this kind of extreme Armenophobia was occurring for the first time. Nevertheless, the Ottoman invasion of Iran in 1723 resulted in a decade of military alliance between the Armenian and Iranian Shiite forces,\textsuperscript{129} which
effectively allayed memories of the Armenian rebellion. In this outcome the Armenian attitudes toward Iranian and Ottoman rule should also be taken into account. Traditionally, the Armenians viewed the former as "the lesser of two evils." This was true as much for the 16-17th centuries as in the 1720s. Suffice it to recall here the Armenian leaders' delegations to Shah Abbas the Great, requesting help "to get rid of the Ottoman yoke" as well as their subsequent logistical and military support to the Iranians in their 1603-1604 offensive against the Ottoman forces then occupying Eastern Armenia (at that time the Armenians were totally unaware of Shah Abbas's plan to deport them into the heart of Iran.)\textsuperscript{130} As for the 1720s, in addition to underscoring the Armeno-Iranian military alliance, a quote from the letter of the Mekhitarist monk Hakob Vardapet Buzayan, written in late September, 1728, from the vicinities of Akhaltzkha (currently a town in the south of Georgia) illustrates the sentiments of this period: "Perhaps I would have entered these districts, if they were under the Iranian administration as before, but now they are controlled by the Ottomans, who are much eviler in their behavior than the Iranians."\textsuperscript{131}

The fact that the Armenians were allowed and accustomed to serve in the Iranian armed forces, while no such thing was possible or ever practiced in the Ottoman Empire, no doubt had played an important role in the formation of the pro-Iranian Armenian attitudes. Furthermore, this fact itself clearly indicates the relatively harsher approaches to the treatment of Armenians and non-Muslim minorities in the Ottoman empire.

\textbf{Ottoman Decision-Making and Exercise on Extermination During the 1720s}

- 34 -
The immediate question is whether there were any decision-making mechanisms for the extermination activities in the Ottoman Empire during the 1720s.

A definite answer is possible. For example, in 1722 and 1726 Abdullah, the mufti, and other chief religious dignitaries were asked by the Sultan to give their opinions on some vital issues of peace and war.\textsuperscript{132} To provide a vivid view for the discussions' scope through this standard procedure, cited below are two of the questions posed to the mufti and his answers on the eve of the Ottoman invasion of Iran in 1723:

**Question:** If, with the permission of the heretic (Tahmasb, the heir to the Iranian throne) who claims the title of Shah, some heretics (i.e., Shiites) fight against Muslims (i.e., Sunnis), is the peace of the Imam of the Muslims, the Sultan of Sultans, thereby violated?

**Reply of the mufti:** Yes, particularly as it is the duty of believers to exterminate these accursed ones, and as any peace with them must be regarded as nothing more than a truce, it is the duty of true believers to break it as soon as they have sufficient strength.

**Question:** How then must action be taken against the heretics of this country (i.e., Iranian Shiites) and those of its inhabitants who are by origin infidels (i.e., the non-Muslims, principally -- Armenian and Georgian Christians)?

**Reply of the mufti:** As regards the heretics, the men must be exterminated by the sword. The male children and the women are to be reduced to slavery and their property is to be converted to Islam by other means than the sword, but it is not permissible to cohabit with these women before they have embraced Islam (i.e., the Sunni form of Islam). As to
the unbelievers, the women and male children are to be reduced to slavery and their property is to be given up to the conqueror. Their women and children are not to be forced to embrace Islam, but it is permissible to cohabit with the women, even when they do not wish to become Muslims.\textsuperscript{133}

Although, the \textit{mufti} refrained from commenting on the fate of the Christian males in Iran, in many regions -- especially in those offering resistance -- they were treated in similar fashion to the Shiites. In another letter from Constantinople of 20 September 1725, it is stated that thousands of Armenian and Iranian prisoners are "all women, boys, and girls; men are extremely rare."\textsuperscript{134} Clearly, the men had been exterminated in implicit accordance with the \textit{mufti}'s ruling cited above, which is additionally attested to in numerous contemporary sources. For example, an Armenian colophon, written in the 1720s, notes that during the taking of Tabriz in 1724 the Ottoman troops "killed all the males, both the Armenians and the Persians, and drove into captivity the women and boys."\textsuperscript{135}

Apparently in a response to the successes of Iranian resistance, the \textit{fatwa} of 1723 was restated in 1730 -- as a Russian officer, who had just returned from Ottoman army headquarters at Ganja, reported on 5 August 1730: "...all \textit{akhun[d]}s recommended to the [Sublime] Porte that the Qizilbash people (i.e., Iranian Shiites) must be destroyed wherever found."\textsuperscript{136}

Within this perview, it is more than plausible that in 1725, after a series of Turkish defeats suffered from the Armenian troops, according to the same traditional procedure of \textit{fatwa} the \textit{mufti} was approached by the Sultan with a question on the treatment of the Armenians (see document 6). The above minutes disclose the fact that at least one hundred and seventy years prior to the organized 1894-1896 massacres of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, the ruling establishment of that country had
habitually exercised an institutionalized decision-making mechanism, that of the fatwa, in respect of activities later to be termed genocide. (Within the decisions quoted above, modern international law would have identified as genocidal at least two of the acts -- killing members of a group and imposing measures intended to prevent births within a group.)\textsuperscript{137}\textsuperscript{137} Further, these decisions were issued to the army and lower strata of the dominant ethnic group and were carried out effectively.

**The Armenian Casualties**

It is no wonder that Ottoman military campaigns inflicted enormous casualties upon Armenian and Iranian populations in the 1720s. Krusinski asserts that:

Besides the 30,000 Armenians who were killed at the taking of the City (Yerevan) [by the Ottoman army], there was (sic) a great number carried into captivity, driven along like so many herds of cattle. Their number diminished so during these wars, that at the end of 1725, there were not half so many in Persia, as before the coming of the Afghans. The only Armenians that continued to make resistance were those that retired to the mountains of Kapan.\textsuperscript{138}\textsuperscript{138}

An Ottoman account mentions that in the first days of the siege of Yerevan “10,000 families and children were taken prisoner.”\textsuperscript{139}\textsuperscript{139} According to the Carmelite missionary Fr. Leander of S. Cecilia, who arrived in Iran in 1732 and gathered evidence regarding the turbulent history of the past decade for his book, entitled *Secondo Viaggio (The Second Journey)*:
The Armenian race in Persia was so diminished from the time of the arrival of the Afghans, i.e. in 1722 up to 1725, that 200,000 may be reckoned as having been killed and taken away as slaves.\footnote{140}

Among numerous Armenian accounts, indirectly documenting the above statements, the Karabakh Armenians' message to Peter the Great (10 March 1725), inter alia, exclaimed:

The Turks have captured Tiflis, Yerevan, Nakhichevan...and the Christian Armenians who have been driven into slavery or massacred are incalculable, countless, and numberless.\footnote{141}

According to the well-informed Joseph Emin, “during the reign of King Peter [the Great] (i.e., in the first quarter of the 18th century) the Armenians were ten times as many [as compared to the 1790s].”\footnote{142} This estimate -- most probably, provided to Emin by senior Armenian churchmen who had perhaps the only reliable data on contemporary Armenian demography -- can be verified by means of two separate pieces of evidence:

1) an analysis of the Russian archival documents on the 18th century demography of Karabakh has revealed \textit{exactly} a tenfold drop in its Armenian population from the 1720s (100,000 families) to 1797 (11,000 families).\footnote{143}

2) in the beginning of the 1730s, an Armenian chronicler asserted that in 1724 the Iranian city of Hamadan had “300 Armenian households, not counting the nearby villages; [however, the Ottoman troops] have so [terribly] massacred and carried them into captivity that now you could hardly find 30 households of them. Suffice it to say that they massacred 300 souls who took
refuge in the church.”

Likewise, the census of the Armenians in Iran proper (without the provinces in East/Iranian Armenia) “made by the order of the bishop of Julfa” at the beginning of the 19th century, counted “12,883 souls—not more than one-sixth of their number before the Afghan invasion (i.e., before 1722).”

Forced Islamization of the Armenian Population

Aiming to shift the demographic situation in the region in their favor, the Ottoman authorities had embarked on the mass forced Islamization of the Armenian Christian population in several regions of Transcaucasia. The available sources point particularly to those regions that were situated between Armenia and the Russian-held Caspian coast. A letter from Ghabala, dated October 28, 1725, reported that dozens of villages in the Armenian districts of Shaki, Ghabala (here alone 37 villages), and Gharasov were:

Muslimized by force (پرپوگاهی با مدنی)....They burnt our sacred books and churches, killed our priests, and many have been martyred for the sake of our faith. So now we are Muslims during the day, and Christians during the night: we have no other choice.

This information is corroborated by the later account of Shneze, a doctor of a Russian mission to Nadir-khan, the Iranian commander-in-chief:

- 39 -
On the 5th [of October 1733] we arrived...in Ghabala. It is entirely populated by the Armenians, most of whom, while [recently] being under Turkish administration, had been forced to accept the Law of Mahommed.\(^{147}\)

In one of his regular situation reports to his Abbot General in Venice, written in the Ottoman capital on 25 July 1725, Petros Vardapet Nurumian (†1752), a Mekhitarist friar with important connections ranging from his fellow Mekhitarists (acting both in the Ottoman provinces and Transcaucasia) to the Catholic missionaries and to the Armenian leadership in Constantinople, noted that 12,000 unmarried Sunni males from the Turkic tribes, "eaters of horse-meat," were "deliberately selected" and sent to settle in Iran and marry there the Shiite and Christian women although, as this friar added, "few of them [i.e., Christian women] are left there."\(^{148}\)

**The Motives for Anti-Armenian Attitudes**

Thus, as early as the 1720s we have evidence of some of the typical anti-Armenian sentiments and motivations actively manipulated two centuries later during the Genocide.

**Geographically** Eastern Armenia (and potentially Western Armenia) came to be seen by the Porte as a possible ally to Russia, its emerging arch-rival already consolidated on the Caucasian approaches. This factor politically differentiated the Armenians from the Iranian Shiites who opposed both Russian and Ottoman rule. Further, the Armenian Seghnaks -- being in a position to cut off at any time the important lines of communication between Ottoman troops and their Sunni allies, the Caucasian mountaineers then occupying certain regions in Eastern Transcaucasia -- represented a real obstacle to Ottoman expansionism. Thus, Salah-
pasha, an Ottoman general captured in March 1725 by Karabakh Armenians (see endnote 72), told them during his interrogation:

"Our king ordered us to do away with the Armenians and Qizilbashes (i.e., Shiites) [living] on these lands. Since the troops of the Russian king have crossed to this side of the [Caspian] Sea, we have to march against them. Consequently, the Armenians must not remain situated between us, and these lands must be depopulated in order to clear our passageway." This pasha also told us that if you had not been between us, we would have marched already against Darband and Baku, which have belonged to us since ancient times.149

Another document dated 17 December 1725150 clarifies this strategy further by stating that "since they [the Ottoman troops] have not conquered the Seghnakh, they fear to come to Shamakhi: they say there is a danger of being attacked from two sides [i.e., from the West, by the Armenians, and from the East, by the Russians] and destroyed."

These statements sent by the Armenian leaders to the Russian high command could have been interpreted as mere diplomatic talk to get early military assistance, if there did not exist conclusive proof of the Turkish design to attack the Russian-held Caspian coast from non-Armenian sources as well. In early 1729 the Venetian ambassador was reporting from Constantinople that "war between the Porte and Russia seemed ominous."151 Ivan Nepluye

(Neplyneff), the Russian Resident at Constantinople, in his reports described in detail the plans by the Porte to attack the Caspian littoral in the autumn of 1729. This planned attack on the Russian contingent was canceled only because of the successes of Iranian
resistance under the rising military commander Nadir.\textsuperscript{152}

**Institutionally** the Armenian Seghnaks persistently defied the Sharia, Islamic law's basic requirement for the obedience of non-Muslims to Muslim rule. Thus, the Armenian agents, who had been sent by the East Armenian leadership to the Ottoman Empire to gather information and serve as liaisons with Western Armenian leaders and who even made contacts with the Assyrian Christians about plans for joint uprisings,\textsuperscript{153} were extremely worried about the changed attitudes of the Ottoman Turks towards the Armenians. On 27 October 1727 they wrote to Minas Tigranian:

> If our enemies discover what is truly in our heart, they would put us to the sword everywhere. They say that "you have betrayed our Mohammed's laws." However, we, disguising ourselves, reply to them that 'we are not the same as those treacherous Armenians (i.e., Eastern Armenians resisting the Ottoman occupation)'....In old times the Turks did not reduce our nation to slavery and treat us so terribly, but now they do.\textsuperscript{154}

**Culturally** in the 1720s the Eastern Armenians as well as Iranian Shiites were subjected to the customary Ottoman military strategy, that of the massive annihilation of enemy populations. This is the sense in which Dadrian argues that "group or cultural standards may prescribe hostile behavior as an appropriate way of acting in certain situations. Such hostility is goal-oriented and need not be stimulated by anger;"\textsuperscript{155} and that "Islam, as interpreted and applied in theocratic Turkey, is at its core a militant creed prescribing the domination of its adherents over subservient conquered and subject peoples. The latters’ failure to be subservient can bring severe retribution, including death."\textsuperscript{156}

- 42 -
The following testimonies dating from the 1720s seem to support Dadrian's analysis. Several Armenian leaders of Kapan in a 24 March 1726 letter to the Russian government described how the Ottoman Turks treated the conquered population of the southern provinces of Eastern Armenia:

The Turks came with a numerous army...and seized many towns, monasteries, convents and villages, and massacred the Christians without mercy. They were unjust to the point that they took even girls of two- and one-year-old, and six-month-old age from their mothers' arms and stabbed them before the eyes of their mothers; and [then] took the mothers into captivity; and looted, and by placing their horses in our churches, turned them into stables; and crushed the crosses and sacred things; and raped the virgins inside the churches, and indulged in lust so much that we must not relate it, since Christians are not supposed to hear such things.\[157\]

The Russian translation of this letter adds that the outrages upon the women had been carried out by the Turks "after their barbarous custom" \[po svoemu varvarskomu obyknoveni1 \].\[158\]

In a letter addressed to Vakhtang VI on 5 February 1725, a representative of twelve Armenian villages of the Muskur region (not far from Russian-held Darband) described in detail their miserable existence under the occupation by the Ottoman Turks and their Caucasian Sunni allies and provided also the latters' justification in these terms:

Two months have already passed since these soldiers have been quartered in our villages... Many women and many girls have died from being continuously raped; some are half
dead. Because they have died and become weak, now, in their place, men are being taken and defiled... So manifold soldieries teach one another that "torturing the giaours (infidels) and mixing with their women is a very great pious deed." so they say one to another... The Turks who are quartered in the [Shamakhi] citadel have written to them (i.e., to the Sunni Caucasian leaders): "Let us join together: you will attack from the outside, we -- from the inside, and we will destroy and do away with these giaurs, [so that] the Muslim faith will increase."¹⁵⁹

The element of revenge also began to play its part. As is stressed in the same document:

"They (i.e., the Ottoman Turks and Caucasian Sunnis) say that 'what the mountain giaours (i.e., Karabakh and Kapan Armenians) did to us and our kindred, we will do a hundredfold to you, giaurs..."¹⁶⁰

If, as a recent unique analysis of vengeance concludes, "at the level of society...vengeance serves power equalization" and if "revenge is the social power regulator in a society without central justice"¹⁶¹ then a desire for a hundredfold retaliation against the rebellious Armenians could well serve as a symbolic demonstration of their manifold, if not hundredfold, inferior social status vis-à-vis the Muslims -- as compared with 'normally-regulated' times in Ottoman Empire. (It is correct that it "is not among vengeance's primary considerations" to equalize "between harm received and harm returned, or proportionality between them."¹⁶²) Another letter from Karabakh of 16 August 1725 states, "Since these [Karabakh] fighters have killed four to five thousand
Turks, they (the Turks) now raid in Yerevan, Tiflis, Kapan, everywhere within their reach, and pillage, killing the adults and driving the children into slavery."\textsuperscript{163}

This vindictive wave reached even Constantinople where the authorities, apart from spreading intimidating rumors about the "total extermination of the Armenians" (see doc. 6 above), enacted certain sanctions against the Christians -- Armenians, Greeks, and even Europeans. These included the imposition of new restrictions against wearing bright colors and certain types of clothing. As a Mekhitarist friar informed his Abbot General in a letter dated July 1, 1726 from Constantinople:

There is a strong vindictiveness (ὑπερεξία) here in Istanbul [against the Christians]...many women were stopped on the road and forbidden to wear collars on their coats as well as yellow shoes, albeit some of them were the nationals of other (i.e., European) countries...And all this is thought to be done in reprisal to the destruction of Turkish troops by the Armenians (κατά την καταστροφήν τῶν Τούρκων απὸ τῶν Αρμένων) (see Table 1) And there is a rumor that Armenian and Greek women will be [forcefully] dressed in black goat-hair parajas (i.e., long Eastern style robes)...\textsuperscript{164}
CONCLUSIONS

As document 6 reveals above, the Sublime Porte questioned the "loyal nation" status of the Armenians as early as the 1720s and did not hesitate to blame the entire Armenian nation (Millet) for the Armenian resistance in Karabakh and Kapan. There remains no doubt that this status had always been very fragile; besides, it contained an inherent danger -- the fact that the Armenians previously had been perceived by the Ottoman Turks as a nation incapable of rebellion psychologically reinforced the latters’ wrath against them. Thus, historically, the formation of anti-Armenian genocidal attitudes in the Ottoman Empire was strongly conditioned also by independent cultural variables. Nevertheless, rumors circulated in the 1720s about the desire of the Sultan to eliminate the Armenians altogether were spread most probably by the Porte itself, with the aim of intimidating the Armenians.

In the 1720s, the Armenians’ apprehensions about "total extermination" were far from being irrational and stemmed from both their sober assessment of the political, institutional, and cultural realities of the 18th century Iranian and the Ottoman Empires and from direct threats made against them. A seemingly ahistorical question suggests itself: if the Ottoman Armenians had risen up for their national liberation in the 1720s, as the Eastern Armenians did, what might the Porte's verdict have been then? In the light of the evidence presented in this study, one can assert
with considerable confidence that having the full support of the military and Muslim clergy the Sultan would have chosen "total extermination of the Armenians" (setting aside the question of what success such a policy might have had). This assertion is significant enough to reconstruct the entire framework of Armenian Genocide studies, hitherto primarily conducted within the context of the period between the 1870 and 1923. That the decision to exterminate the Armenians was considered long before the Ottoman Empire was collapsing at the turn of this century indicates an urgent need to explore thoroughly the relevant historical data from the early modern Ottoman period. At the same time, it points to a much needed reappraisal of the crucial role that culture and symbols played in the history of the Turkish-Armenian relations.

Three basic considerations, among others, could have dissuaded the Ottoman régime from undertaking the extermination of the Armenians in the 1720s.

1) Although we have some scanty evidence about the Armenian attempts to prepare uprisings within the Ottoman state (in the provinces of Van and Diarbekir, but possibly elsewhere as well) in the 1720s with the aim of joining the Eastern Armenian liberation war, these plans were never realized. A number of historical reasons were responsible for this outcome of which the two decisive ones were: (a) the Eastern Armenian leadership's failure to expand effectively its political-military power beyond Karabakh and Kapan during the 1722-1724 period and (b) the early concentration of large Ottoman armies in the region. Further, the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople, together with the influential class of the Armenian bankers and merchants, worked vigorously towards the restoration of their image as a "loyal nation." For example, in violation of several principles of
the bylaws of the Armenian Church in February 1726 they elected in Constantinople a new Patriarch of All Armenians, Karapet Ulnetzi (1726-1729), an Ottoman Armenian cleric who unlike his predecessor was fully trusted by the Sublime Porte and was able to establish favorable relations with the new Ottoman administration of Eastern Armenia. Thus, the Ottoman Armenians continued to live in full compliance with the provisions of the Millet system, characterized by the superordinate-subordinate dichotomy between the ruling group and other ethnoreligious entities.

2) Any massive destruction of the population in the Ottoman Armenian provinces would have resulted in the complete devastation of the rear and communication lines of the Ottoman armies that were fighting with bitter exertion and varying success on the Iranian fronts. In effect, under the material conditions of the time such an undertaking would have caused an outright defeat of the Porte in its Iranian campaign. Furthermore, it could have provoked a larger Armenian uprising.

3) Finally, economic considerations were of prime importance as well. In this regard let it suffice to quote Michel Febvre, the seventeenth century Italian missionary, who served in the Ottoman Empire for a long period:

[The Turks] are tolerating the Christians and Jews on account that they benefit from them more than from their [Muslim] subjects. And they allow them to live on the [same] basis, as it is done for sheep and bees -- for their milk and honey.

In this respect one point calls for discussion. Subsequently,
only two distinct historical time frames allowed the Armenians to organize national-liberation movements comparable in dimension with the armed struggle of 1722-1735. First, during the period from the 1890s to 1921, the year when the first Armenian republic (the two and a half year-old achievement of preceding hard struggle) was finally crushed under joint Russian-Turkish pressure; second, from 1988 to 1994, during the national campaign for the liberation of Karabakh from Azerbijani domination.

It is of considerable interest to note that despite clear dissimilarities all three of these ethnopolitical social movements arose and developed in geopolitical situations, which had following major identical characteristics:

1. The outbreak of sharp interethnic and interstate conflicts throughout the Caucasian region, including Transcaucasia;

2. The intense geostrategic rivalry between Turkey, Iran, and Russia;

3. The derivation of the Caucasian crises from sweeping internal crises in at least one of the above mentioned regional “superpowers,” specifically:

   a) the period from 1722 to 1735 witnessed successive Afghan, Russian, and Turkish invasions of Iran and the concomitant breakdown of the Safavid Empire;

   b) the period from the 1890s to 1921 coincided with a series of regional wars, World War I, and successive revolutions in all three powers -- in Russia (1905-1906, 1917), in Iran (1905-1911), and in Turkey (1908, 1919-1922).

   c) the period from 1988 to 1994 corresponded to the collapse of the Soviet Empire and its serious aftermaths.

As for the Armenian liberation attempt of the 1720s, although
it had many elements of self-defense (especially in the protracted armed resistance of Karabakh and Kapan), it had been planned decades before and therefore affords a unique case of rebellion whose original aim was -- as stressed at the clandestine meeting of the Vaspurakan Armenians in September 1722 where there was a broad representation of the population -- "the liberation of all of blood-drenched Armenia". Thus, the Armenian liberation movement of the 1720s differed substantially from the movement at the turn of this century, which was essentially a self-defense phenomenon overwhelmingly concerned with the physical preservation of Western Armenia rather than the independence of all Armenia. Recently, Mkrtich Nersisian, the patriarch of genocide studies in Armenia, pointed once again to the false thesis of modern Turkish historiography that depicts the Ottoman Empire as a harmonious living place for every ethnic grouping. The late medieval-early modern Armenian aspirations for independence, demonstrated most vigorously in the 1720s, prove the reality of severe ethnoreligious oppression as practiced and institutionalized in the Ottoman state.

The Ottoman ruling establishment's new, Europeanized military thinking, which ensued in the 19th century, could have had only a modest impact on the Porte's genocidal policies of the turn of this century. James Reid's idea that the Ottoman Turkish military strategy of the massive destruction of populations developed later only through the 19th century following upon 1) the experience substructure of the raid tactics of irregulars in Turkey and the Caucasus, and 2) the influence of the modern European warfare concept of total war, now appears to be unconvincing. As has been shown here, the Ottoman Turks had developed their own "annihilation ethic" much earlier. Much more valid is Dadrian's presentation of "Islamic Sacred Law as a Matrix of Ottoman Legal Order and Nationality Conflicts." Indeed, "genocidal ideologies may persist for a long time without
becoming actualized in genocides."  

Turkish society proved to be extremely reluctant to accept modernization as implemented through Tanzimat reforms in the 19th century. Certainly the reforms did not reach and change the traditional Millet structure of intercommunal attitudes. As a result, the Ottoman Turks retained and perpetuated many elements of their early modern society, including the belief system underpinning that society up to and during the Armenian massacres period of the 1890s-1922. Specifically, the Ottoman-Turkish tradition of genocidal retribution towards a rebellious ethnic group emerged during the Armenian Genocide in a twofold sense:

1) It provided a ready and convenient model for the Ottoman elite to exterminate the Armenians. Thus, Henry Morgenthau, American Ambassador to Turkey from 1913 to 1916, echoed this conclusion: "They (Ottoman elite) criticized their ancestors for neglecting to destroy or convert the Christian races to Mohammedanism at the time when they first subjugated them. Now... they thought the time opportune to make good the oversight of their ancestors in the 15th century." According to Austrian Vice-Field Marshal Pomiankowski, another well-informed witness and observer of the Armenian Genocide, "many intelligent Turks" spoke out that the conquered people "ought to have been exterminated long ago."

2) Since it was already well known to the official classes and lower strata of the ruling ethnoreligious group, the order on the extermination of the Armenians was, using Morgenthau's parlance, "enthusiastically approved" by them and put into a conventional pattern of hostile behavior.

Finally, to recall and slightly amplify Mosca, "whatever practical value political science (including genocide studies -- A. A.) may have in the future, progress in that field will be based upon the study of the facts of society, and those facts can be found
only in the history of the various nations....it is to the old historical method that we must return." 182
Notes

In the text Persia and Iran are used interchangeably. Although I follow the source whenever it has Persia, I myself prefer to use Iran. Also, I have translated as "Iran" the *Qizilbashi yerkir* ("country of the Qizilbashis") frequently used in the Armenian sources.

I have preferred the Armenian usage of Yerevan rather than the 16-19th century European Erivan (while, of course, leaving this usage in the source as it is).

In the text all emphases are mine. All dates are in the Old Style, which, in the 1720s, was ahead of the New Style by 11 days.

In the quoted excerpts, brackets are used to indicate information derived from the context of a given source, while parentheses indicate editorial matter that provide explanations or supplementary material.
AIVAZ, I -- Ա. Մ. Աիվազիան, "1720 թվականի թթ. պատմական տնտեսության մեջ սինիկի պաշտոնականություն," [Ա. Մ. Աիվազիան, "From the History of the 1720s Liberation Movement in Siunik"] PBH (see below in this list) 129:2 (1990), pp. 119-134.


AVPR -- Arxiv Vnewnej Politiki Rossii. Moskva [The Archives of Foreign Policy of Russia, Moscow].


- 55 -


DB -- *Ghukas Sebastatzi, Davit Bek or the History of the Kapanians*, 2nd ed. (first published in London in 1792), (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1918).

EMIN -- The Life and Adventures of Joseph Emin, an Armenian, written in English by himself. 2nd ed. (first published in London in 1792), (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1918).


PBH -- *Historical-Philological Journal*, Yerevan: Publ. of the Academy of Sciences of Armenia, 1958 --.

SHAY -- Mary L. Shay, *The Ottoman Empire from 1720 to 1734. As Revealed in Despatches of the Venetian Baily*. (Urbana: The Univ. of Illinois Press, 1944).


YEGHIA -- *YeghiƯ Astvatsaturian Musheghian* [H. Voskian, *Yeghia Astvatsaturian Musheghian*]
Endnotes


As a matter of fact, Davit-bek was a leader of the Armenian principality of Kapan without exercising any power or additional leverages in the bigger Armenian self-governing area of Karabakh, whose leaders are well-known (see in study). Bournoutian, in addition, confuses the date of the Russian incursion into Iran of August-October 1722, fixing this event at 1723 (Bournoutian, A History of Qarabagh, op. cit., p. 17, note 62). The recent incompetent essay on the rise of Armenian nationalism by another American historian has effectively overlooked this period as well; See Ronald Grigor Suny, Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1993), pp. 52-62.

LOCK, pp. 176-189, 238-250.


For the details, see AIVAZ, II, pp. 76-85.


See LOCK, pp. 185-186, 188, 212-235; cf. YESAYI, p. 50.

Ibid., pp. 212-235; SHAY, pp. 115-122.

See LOCK, pp. 255-258; PAY, p. 41.

For example, in 1417 Matteos Monozon, a certain scribe writing in Gandzasar monastery, defined the region as "Artzakh, now known as Khachen" (உர்த்கர் மங்குமள்ளது, பட்சம் கங்கை முடிக்க); see L. L. ης αμάθηται, ζωικόν δύσωραρή χάρακταράνθα, όφ ρα (1401 1450) [The Colophons of the Armenian Manuscripts, the XVth century; 1401-1450. Ed. L. S. Khachikian]. ζω. ης, ης, ης, 1955, p. 195.

The position of the Karabakh Armenians is explicitly stated in their message of 11 May 1725 to the Russians
(as related in the Russian summary of that document): "the Armenians pledge... that whenever they have Russian aid they will oppose the Persians as well, but to do that at present is just impossible." in ARO, II, doc. 253.
On the correction of the date and analysis of important particulars of this document, see AIVAZ, III, pp. 75-76, note 50.

15 This divergence in numbers reflected the tides of the war. See EZOV, docs. 213, 215, 216, 219, 224, 231, 233, 252, 301; CARM, I, p. 578; KRUS, p. 131; Arut1n[n, op. cit., pp. 158-162; VOYSKO, pp. 69-72; AIVAZ, III, pp. 68-71.

16 The sudden reemergence of the Armenian armed forces occurred after some two and a half centuries of their relative "invisibility." From the 13th through 15th centuries, the Muslim rulers of Armenia, Mongols, Karakoyunlu and Akkoyunlu Turcomans, conducted deliberate policies aimed at the destruction of the Armenian nobility, who then constituted the Armenian military class. By the 16th century, the Armenian military forces had disintegrated to the extent that they were incapable of undertaking major -- especially offensive -- combat assignments by themselves. Nevertheless, some Armenian forces, headed by the residue of national nobility, managed to survive. Geographically, the military organization persisted in primarily mountainous regions of Armenia, most notably, in Karabakh and Kapan in Eastern/Iranian Armenia, and in Sassun, Zeytun, Raiberd, Hamshen and parts of Vaspurakan in Western/Ottoman Armenia.

17 There is an extensive bibliography on Armenian Meliks and Melikdoms. Consult, for example, B. Ulubabian, "The Principality of Khachen in the X-XVIth centuries" [W. Ulubabian, The Principality of Khachen in the X-XVIth centuries] (Yerevan, 1975), pp. 416-421; Robert H. Hewsen,"The Meliks of

19 N. T. Nakawidze,  Georgia-russkie politiqeskie otnoveni[v v pervoj polovine XVII veka [N. T. Nakashidze, The Georgian-Armenian Political Relations in the First Half of the 18th century] Եվրոպա, իշխան, pp. 95-97; L. Բուխարիստի Պետ, op. cit., pp. 112-113. In the rendering of this passage into French, these 40,000 Karabakh Armenian soldiers are wrongly referred to as the army of the Georgian prince Teymuraz I (1589-1663). See M. Brosset,  Histoire de la Géorgie. T. II, liv. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1856), p. 64. Brosset’s mistake was later mechanically used by Leo and Ashot Hovhannissian (see Լևոն, Պետականական հարաբերություններ ու Արմևոր զարգացմունքներ Հայոց և Վրաց ազգային գրականություն, ազգերի հարաբերություն, ռազմական պատմություններ, համաշխարհային և հատորի հերթականություն [Leo, The Capital of Khojas and Its Political-Social Role in the Life of Armenians] Երևան, Գրականություն, 1984, p. 150 and Աշոտ Հովհաննիսյան, Պետականական հարաբերություններ Հայոց և Վրաց ազգային գրականություն, ռազմական պատմություն, համաշխարհային և հատորի հերթականություն [Ashot Ioannissian, The Essays on the Armenian Emancipation Thought] Երևան, Գրականություն, ՖՈ, p. 338]. I wish to thank here Dr. Pavlik Chobanian of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Armenian Academy of Sciences, who at my request kindly checked and translated the entire aforementioned report by Gorgijanidze from the Georgian original. To summarize, in spring 1632 Teymuraz I of Kakheti, heading (as stressed in Nakawidze, op. cit., p. 95) the "Armeno-Georgian united forces", attacked the south-eastern provinces of Iranian Transcaucasia and for a brief period took control over Ganja, Karabakh, Yerevan and some of other territories north of the Arax river. According to
Gorgijanidze, when Teymuraz arrived at Barda, the town near Ganja, the "Armenian Catholicos of Gandzasar," Hovhannes Shahmasuretsi Hasan-Jalalian, came to him "with a large army (sic) and gifts" and strongly urged him to exploit the success and execute a march to the south of the Arax, on Tabriz, the northern capital of Persia. In particular, the Catholicos argued:

Ghayen (i.e., the Iranian shah) and khontkar (i.e., the Ottoman sultan) have risen against each other. There will never be a time like this again; you have the troops from all seven principalities of Georgia with you, [in addition] I will give you 40,000 musketeers. March with this force on Tabriz and we will seize Tabriz within seven days... .


20 See *ARO*, II, doc. 167 (written on Aug. 18, 1722); doc. 204 (March 5, 1724); doc. 291 written on Feb. 25, 1724 refers to 30,000 horsemen and 10,000 footmen; see also *AVPR*, Files entitled "Relations with Persia," inventory 1, 1726, file 4, fols. 56b (document written on Nov. 12, 1725); *ibid.*, fol. 213a (document written on Jan. 13, 1726), *CARM*, I, p. 578; *KRUS*, p. 131.

21 See *ARO*, II, doc. 291.

22 On his mission, see Ο. Φ. Αβραμιάν, Ο Τ. Ταξιαρχικός Αρμένικος, Περί Της Αρμενο-Γουρανίτικης Εκκλησίας και της Αρμενικής Σημαντικότητας (παρατηρήσεις και αναφορές) [A. G. Abrahamian, A Page from the History of the Peoples of Transcaucasia and Armeno-Russian Relations. A Study and Archival Documents] Ρωσικά, 901, 1953, pp. 5-139.
The document mentions six commanders for four sections of the Karabakh army. The reason is that in 1728, Avan-yuzbashi and his brother Tarkhan (who was also his deputy as a commander-in-chief) left Karabakh for the Russian-held Caspian coast in the vain attempt to solicit Russian military assistance. In 1729 they were planning to return to Armenia, which later proved to be impossible.

ARO, II, doc. 375.

EZOV, pp. XLI-XLIII and docs. 144, 158.

YEGHIA, p. 49.

VOYSKO, doc. 3, p. 100.

A later version on the introduction of modern fire-arms into Karabakh clearly exaggerates the role of the Karabakh Armenian commander-in-chief Avan-yuzbashi (perhaps, because it was originally provided to the source by his immediate family as late as the 1760s and recorded in writing in 1792). According to this, at some time in 1719, after a defeat of an Iranian force 18,000 strong, "five hundred mule loads of fire-arms were distributed among the subjects of five chiefs of Karabagh, where, by all accounts, there had been no more than two match-lock pieces in each chief's arsenal. It was Avan the First (i.e., Avan-yuzbashi; see note 56 below and its text -- A. A.) who introduced complete fire-arms in those mountains. This happened some years before the destruction of Shah Sultan Hus[a]in (i.e., before 1722)."

EMIN, pp. 200-201.

- 64 -
After being in Georgia and gaining high esteem and admiration among the Armenians, he was ordered by the Georgian prince Heraclius (1720-1798) to leave the country or face death, since: "The greatest part of his subjects are Armenians, trained up in wars against the Lazguis; he is very suspicious, and even afraid of a revolt from them, the consequence of which may be fatal to him." EMIN, p. 394; cf. p. 233 of the same source, where Heraclius himself stresses that "the best part of my subjects are Armenians." The analysis of these episodes is provided in A. R. Ioannis[n. Josif Emin [Joseph Emin]. Erevan, Izd-vo Erevanskogo Gosuniversiteta, J¢œ, ss. ™∞-™∞∞.

YESAYI, p. 46.

For the details, see AIVAZ, II, p. 82, note 27.

Ibid., pp. 79-85.

YESAYI, p. 53; for the French translation, see M. Brosset. Collection, op. cit., p. 216, 218. The presence of Armenian soldiers in the Georgian troops had also been recorded in other sources written in the 17th century, see Zakaria Sarkavag, Chronicle. L. P (Zakaria Sarkavag, 1870), pp. 96-98 and 97-98, op. cit., pp. 114, 116.


42 *EMIN*, pp. 2-3.


45 *KRUS*, p. 178.


Ibid., doc. 3, pp. 100-101.

49. A. Abrahamian, *The Archive of Yeghia Karnetzi* [А. Abrahamian, *The Archive of Yeghia Karnetzi*] (Yeghia, 1968), docs. 117, 136, 163. However, in late 1724, Rafael and Taghi, probably out of fear of their kinship with Davit-bek, left the Iranian camp and entered the Russian army as senior commanders of the Armenian detachments. After 1724 we have no evidence on Parsadan-bek except that his death and burial occurred in Ardabil; see VOYSKO, doc. 79, pp. 237-238, 451-452.

50. See *DB*, p. 143. Exactly the same confusion, although transparent for contemporaries, has puzzled modern historians. Laurence Lockhart's treatment of Joseph (Hovsep) Apisalaimian, an intriguing Armenian personality born in Tiflis, is one such example. The latter, in one document, termed himself a Georgian. This, together with the fact that Joseph omitted his surname in another of his writings, drove Lockhart into a mistaken and definitely bewildered line of thought: "He regarded himself as a Georgian presumably because he was born in Tiflis. One wonders whether he suppressed his obviously Armenian name in order to support his claim to be a Georgian, but in that case he would have had to invent some suitable surname, and that he does not appear to have done." *LOCK*, p. 508. Lockhart's article on Joseph Apisalaimian is *ibid.*, pp. 504-510.


53 «Դուստրականության տեսաբանություն Վարսերում Գեղարքունի» Հոբուդի
Հայազգ Հայազղություն ու. հ. 208; համարակալեց որ կարգավորված պատմություն է մեկ
Արանում, պ. 65.

54 YEGHIA, p. 18.

55 Եգերալ Գեղարքունի, ո. կ. հ. 75, 154. For the
documentation firmly placing Gegharkuni within
Armenian self-governing areas in the 1720s, see ARO, II,
docs. 229, 231, 315, 342. From the 9th century onwards
the easternmost part of Gegharkuni was under the
political-administrative control of the
Artsakh/Khachen/Karabakh Armenian feudals; for the
details, see Եգերալ Գեղարքունի, ո. կ. հ. 36-38, 403-416.

56 On the biography of Avan-Yuzbashi, see AIVAZ, III, pp.
67-71. See also EMIN, pp. 200-202. It is interesting to
note that some Armenians continue to serve in the
modern Iranian armed forces, "particularly in technical
positions within the air force;" see Nikola B.
Schahgaldian, The Iranian Military Under the Islamic

57 For example, in his 11 May 1727 memorandum to the
Empress, Yekaterina I (1725-1727), Prince Vasily V.
Dolgorukiy (1667-1746), the commander-in-chief of the
Russian troops in the Caspian regions from 1726 to 1728,
was bewildered at the persistent and effective resistance
of the Karabakh and Kapan Armenian troops against, as
he wrote, "their powerful enemy, Sari Mustafa pasha
[Ottoman Turkish general] with his army....It is beyond
the human judgment how does God but himself preserve
them, how are they still able to defend themselves against
such a powerful enemy?"
(толéko kak sam Bog ix xranit syyve uma geloveqeskogo, kak ot takogo silénogo nepri[tel[t mogut seb[ e\e soderhaté?] ARO, II, doc. 355, p. 294.

- 68 -
HANW, p. 211; the number of Armenian men fighting in this defense is established by my analysis of the data in
[Abraham Yerevantzi, *The History of Wars, 1721-1736*]
(Armenian Men Fighting in the Defense), *Ge9glgt F9fughvj*
[Abraham Yerevantzi, *The History of Wars, 1721-1736*]

AIVAZ, V, pp. 102-114.

AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-94. On the military collaboration between Karabakh and Kapan, see AIVAZ, I, pp. 130-133; AIVAZ, III, pp. 63-80; AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-90.

On this term, see additionally *LOCK*, p. 260 (note 2), 357; *GILAN*, pp. 71-72. For the Armenian, Russian, Persian, and Turkish usage of this term, see ARO, I, p. XLI, ARO, II, docs. 240, 246, 301, 324, 353, 373, etc.; ARO, III, docs. 5, 7; *Ge9glgt F9fughvj*, pp. 63-80; AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-90.

On this term, see additionally *LOCK*, p. 260 (note 2), 357; *GILAN*, pp. 71-72. For the Armenian, Russian, Persian, and Turkish usage of this term, see ARO, I, p. XLI, ARO, II, docs. 240, 246, 301, 324, 353, 373, etc.; ARO, III, docs. 5, 7; *Ge9glgt F9fughvj*, pp. 63-80; AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-90.

AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-94. On the military collaboration between Karabakh and Kapan, see AIVAZ, I, pp. 130-133; AIVAZ, III, pp. 63-80; AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-90.

AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-94. On the military collaboration between Karabakh and Kapan, see AIVAZ, I, pp. 130-133; AIVAZ, III, pp. 63-80; AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-90.

AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-94. On the military collaboration between Karabakh and Kapan, see AIVAZ, I, pp. 130-133; AIVAZ, III, pp. 63-80; AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-90.

AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-94. On the military collaboration between Karabakh and Kapan, see AIVAZ, I, pp. 130-133; AIVAZ, III, pp. 63-80; AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-90.

AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-94. On the military collaboration between Karabakh and Kapan, see AIVAZ, I, pp. 130-133; AIVAZ, III, pp. 63-80; AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-90.

AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-94. On the military collaboration between Karabakh and Kapan, see AIVAZ, I, pp. 130-133; AIVAZ, III, pp. 63-80; AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-90.

AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-94. On the military collaboration between Karabakh and Kapan, see AIVAZ, I, pp. 130-133; AIVAZ, III, pp. 63-80; AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-90.

AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-94. On the military collaboration between Karabakh and Kapan, see AIVAZ, I, pp. 130-133; AIVAZ, III, pp. 63-80; AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-90.

AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-94. On the military collaboration between Karabakh and Kapan, see AIVAZ, I, pp. 130-133; AIVAZ, III, pp. 63-80; AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-90.

AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-94. On the military collaboration between Karabakh and Kapan, see AIVAZ, I, pp. 130-133; AIVAZ, III, pp. 63-80; AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-90.

AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-94. On the military collaboration between Karabakh and Kapan, see AIVAZ, I, pp. 130-133; AIVAZ, III, pp. 63-80; AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-90.

AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-94. On the military collaboration between Karabakh and Kapan, see AIVAZ, I, pp. 130-133; AIVAZ, III, pp. 63-80; AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-90.

AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-94. On the military collaboration between Karabakh and Kapan, see AIVAZ, I, pp. 130-133; AIVAZ, III, pp. 63-80; AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-90.

AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-94. On the military collaboration between Karabakh and Kapan, see AIVAZ, I, pp. 130-133; AIVAZ, III, pp. 63-80; AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-90.

AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-94. On the military collaboration between Karabakh and Kapan, see AIVAZ, I, pp. 130-133; AIVAZ, III, pp. 63-80; AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-90.

AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-94. On the military collaboration between Karabakh and Kapan, see AIVAZ, I, pp. 130-133; AIVAZ, III, pp. 63-80; AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-90.

AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-94. On the military collaboration between Karabakh and Kapan, see AIVAZ, I, pp. 130-133; AIVAZ, III, pp. 63-80; AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-90.
These people (i.e., the Armenians) taking advantage of the present circumstances, formed themselves into a kind of republic, which, as we have mentioned, distinguished itself by the total defeat of a body of six thousand men, whom Abdallah Basha had sent against them the preceding summer [of 1725]... .

HANW, p. 252. However, to speak about "a kind of republic" does not seem possible in the case of Kapan, where Davit Bek (†1728), an outstanding military talent, established a strong dictatorial rule. In contrast, Karabakh was a coalition of five major Seghnakhs, with the crucial decisions often being made in the Councils of their leaders; for example, on the big Council in Gandzasar at the end of February 1724, see ARO, II, doc. 291. On the five major Seghnakhs, see ARO, I, pp. XXXIX-XLI; Hewsen, “The Meliks of Eastern Armenia,” I, op. cit., pp. 300-301.

For these battles, see DB, pp. 140-143; ARO, II, doc. 375-379; ARO, III, docs. 5, 7, mentioning that "although three times the Turks attacked them this [1730] summer, they (the Armenians) succeeded in defending themselves." V. M. Martirosian, The Collaboration of the Armenian and Georgian Peoples in the Liberation Struggle of the 1720s, pp. 168-172. AVPR, Files entitled "Relations with Persia," inventory 1, 1729, file 1, fol. 20, noting in particular: "the Armenians have destroyed so many Turks, that never in a [previous] battle have so many Turks perished." AVPR, inventory 77/1, file no. 5, fols. 7, 9, fixing the Armenian victory in the beginning of April 1730.
This victory was a result of the joint actions by the Iranian Shiite, Armenian and Georgian forces; see AIVAZ, III, pp. 71-73; ARO, II, pp. LXVI-LXXV.

HANW, p. 212; J. de Hammer, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman. Tome XIV (Paris, 1839), p. 128; LOCK, p. 261. Yerevan was defended jointly by the Armenians and the Iranian garrison. However, on August 14, 1724, at the beginning of one of the fiercest Turkish assaults, the Armenians, defending some districts of the city outside the citadel, were abandoned by their Muslim allies who fled into the castle. Nevertheless, in a battle that proceeded for five days the Armenians alone managed to hurl the Turks back. With 6,000 deaths (as against 3,300 men, killed on the Armenian side) and dismayed at such losses, some Turkish battalions openly mutinied. However, with the arrival of fresh reinforcements the city outside the castle was taken by storm on September 8. For a detailed analysis of the defense of Yerevan, see AIVAZ, IV, pp. 93-100.

See above in the text and notes 44-47.

Two of the three commanders of the destroyed Turkish division were killed, while the third one, Salah-pasha, was captured; see ARO, docs. 304, 309, 310, 312-325; AIVAZ, VI, p. 87, note 12.

AIVAZ, VI, p. 88.

Ibid., p. 87, n. 12; Կ. Երևան, Կ. Երևան, op. cit., pp. 264-265, docs. 17, 19; cf. HANW, p. 252; DB, p. 103 (doc. 30).

ARO, II, docs. 335-336. That the Jermuk battle was the fourth major Turkish failure inflicted on them in Karabakh and Kapan could be indirectly confirmed by a 1 August 1726 cipher message by general V. Levashov.
(1667-1751), head of the Russian administration in the occupied Caspian regions, to A. I. Osterman, Russian vice-chancellor (1686-1747): "More than once, after hard preparations, the Turks marched on the Armenians, but were defeated on [all] four battles, and up to date the Armenians are resisting them." See Г. Ф. Тарновский, op. cit., pp. 131-132.

76 On July 26, 1726 Ivan Nepliuyev, the Russian Resident to the Sublime Porte, reported from Constantinople recent news that "...at first the Armenian people agreed to recognize the suzerainty of the Porte on the same conditions as they lived under the Persians, but the Ganjian serasker (commander-in-chief), Sari Mustafa pasha, not satisfied by that sent against them 12,000-strong corps which they defeated." See PAY, p. 56; cf. Г. Ф. Тарновский, op. cit., pp. 163-164.

77 In this eight-day battle two Turkish generals, one of them the Captain of the Jannissaries (Yenkichari-aghasi), were killed, which forced serasker Saru-Mustafa pasha, the commander-in-chief of Turkish troops in the Transcaucasus, to flee rather than march back to Ganja, withdrawing nightly and "covering a two-day road in one day." See ARO, II, doc. 346, p. 286; doc. 350, pp. 290-291. The Armenians counted the Turkish attack force to have 40,000 soldiers, including the troops provided by a Caucasian warlord Ahmad-khan; see ibid., doc. 356, p. 296. A contemporary Turkish account describes this assault on Shushi as a full success, but at the same time registers that "because of the forthcoming winter colds serasker returned to Ganja and embarked on the fortifying of the city's defenses." This indication leaves no doubt that after the military setback serasker decided to be prepared for a possible Armenian counterattack. See Г. Ф. Тарновский, op. cit., pp. 158-159.
November 1726, apparently, immediately after receiving the news on the Shushi battle, Prince Vasily Dolgorukiy informed the Russian Empress:

...the Armenians have defeated the Turks on many occasions and entreat us to join them with our troops....They are fighting against the Turks with fortitude and great valor, and, if, at this favorable time, it were possible for our troops to join the Armenians, taking into account the Turkish weakness, it could be hoped that our actions might be highly effective.


78 DB, p. 136-137, 170; cf. Սեպուր Հայաստան, Հայաստանի պատմություն [Mikael Chamchiantz, History of Armenia] Հատ. 4 (Երևան, 1784), pp. 794 795. The date of this battle has been established in AIVAZ, VI, pp. 88-90, 100. The Armenians counted 148 military banners among the captured materiel. We may compare this figure to the 13,000 casualties of the Ottoman army. Evidently, every century of the Ottoman army had its own banner. Thus the Armenians captured the banners of 130 destroyed centuries as well as 18 additional banners, which belonged to larger Ottoman units and probably to escaped centuries.

79 DB, pp. 138, 171-172; cf. Սեպուր Հայաստան, Հայաստանի պատմություն, Հատ. 4, op. cit., p. 796:

80 HANW, p. 252. The victory over the Turks was obtained during the Easter-tide 1727 (Easter Sunday was on April
2). Most probably, this was the battle where the Armenians captured the trophy guns, cf. Մարաթքերեկու, op. cit., p. 167.

81 DB, p.139.


83 DADR, III, p. 395.


85 ARO, II, doc. 169.


87 On the biography of Tigranian, consult, for example, GILAN, pp. XVI-XVIII.
Gregory the Illuminator, apostle, converted the Armenians to Christianity in 301. He is regarded as the father of the Armenian Church.

The high degree of reliability of the data in this journal has been underscored by all the experts in the field; see Petros di Sargis Gilanenc, Dnevnik osady Ispagani afganami (1722-1723). Trans. into Russian and commentaries by Prof. K. Patkanov fNS. Peterburg: Tipografii Imper. AN, 1870), p. XXIII; Արծիծե Հայոց, Հայոց եղբայր Գեզմահաղ [Ashot Ioannissian, Petros di Sargis Gylanentz] (U. Երևան, 1916), p. 12; LOCK, pp. 506-509; GILAN, pp. X-XII.


Cf. Doc. 7, authored by Yeghia Musheghian.

The persistence of such an attitude just under one and a half centuries later is exposed in the letters of a Turkish soldier (23 November and 23 December 1895): "My brother, if you want news from here, we have killed 1,200 Armenians, all of them as food for dogs..." and "I killed [the Armenians] like dogs," quoted in DADR, IV, p. 265.

Since Minasian's rendering of these passages into English had some clear misreadings of the original, my own translation appears above. See Հայոց, Հայոց եղբայր Գեզմահաղ, "Հայոց, Հայոց եղբայր Գեզմահաղ" no. 3 (Tiflis, 1863), pp. 209, 211-212; cf. GILAN, pp. 65, 68; cf. also Dnevnik osadi Ispagani, op. cit., pp. 53-56.

ARO, II, doc. 192.

Built in 1216, this monastery was the spiritual and political center of Karabakh throughout the 14-18th centuries; for a short account and bibliography on Gandzasar, see B. Ulubabian, M. Hasratian, Gandzasar (Milan: OEMME Edizioni, 1987).

ARO, II, doc. 287.

See PAY, pp. 70-80.

ARO, II, doc. 310; for the translation into Russian, see doc. 304.

ARO, II, doc. 309.

ARO, II, doc. 214.

Ibid., p. 346, note 121.


On Cholaq Surkhai khan of Caucasian Qazi-Qumiks, an influential pro-Turkish Sunni warlord, see, LOCK, pp. 127, 177, 267, 356-357.

ARO, II, doc. 215.

ARO, II, doc. 223.

On his activities in Constantinople, see *Kh. Chemchemian, The Printing Mission of Mekhitar Abbot General* (Erevan: Izd. AN Arm. SSR, 1980), pp. 73, 80, 83.


DB, p. 97.


SHAY, p. 91; cf. pp. 34-35, 37, 56-57, 94-95, 103, 114, 130. The ultimate control by the Sultan of the mufti is clearly shown, for example, in the answers given by the latter to the ambassador of the Sunni Afghans in 1726 (these answers were carefully adjusted to the Sultan's
current policy); see LOCK, pp. 282-286. Cf. [Ricaut], Monarxi Turecka opisannay prez Rikota, byywe vanglijskogo sekretarna posolstva pri Ottomanskoj Porte. Per. s polsk. na ros. [zyk (S. Peterburg, [¶]), p. 6: "many muftis were sacked for the opposition to his [the Sultan's] direction..."


See A. 282, "It's的手[Rogovitsuch]; "Hapitaliya, 1887, pp. 82-91.


See A. 282, "It's的手[Rogovitsuch]; "Hapitaliya, 1887, pp. 82-91.


For the details and additional bibliography, see *AIVAZ*, I-VI.


See *KRUS*, pp. 43-44, 46, 53-55, 61, 72-73.

*KRUS*, p. 53.


See H. Papasian, "Armeno-Iranian Relations in the Islamic Period," *op. cit.*, pp. 473-475; *AIVAZ*, VI, pp. 94-99. From 1723 to 1735, the only case when Armenian units fought against the Iranian troops alongside the invading Turkish army was in Nakhichevan in July 1724. It was brought about by the previous harsh treatment of local Armenians by the Iranian authorities; for a detailed analysis of this episode, see *AIVAZ*, V, pp. 102-114.

131 DB, p. 110.

132 See LOCK, pp. 251-252, 282-286.

133 Ibid., pp. 251-252; J. de Hammer, op. cit., pp. 91-93; Mohammed A. Hekmat, Essai sur l'Histoire des Relations Politiques Irano-Ottomanes de 1722 à 1747 (Paris, 1937), p. 119. For the Turkish text, see Muhammad Rashid, Tarikhi-i-Rashid Efendi, Vol. III, Constantinople, in the year 1153 of Hegira (i.e., in 1740/1741), fols. 16b-17a (the author of this portion is Mustafa Chelebi-zada).

134 DB, 100 (doc. 22); cf. pp. 96 (doc. 9), 98 (doc. 18), 100 (docs. 23, 24), 178; ARO, II, doc. 335.

135 Ըպատել Նամագահ։ Ըպատել Նամագահ XVI-XVIII դարեր։ [Manuel Zulalian, Western Armenia in the XVI-XVIIIth Centuries] (Երևան, 1980), p. 99:

136 ARO, III, doc. 6. On the term akhund, see note 101 above.


138 KRUS, p. 178.

139 Թուրքական ժամանակաշրջան, op. cit., p. 143.


141 ARO, II, doc. 309.

142 A letter written on 1 January 1792; see PBH 131:4 (1990), p. 193.
While counting the population of Karabakh, one should also remember that in the 18th century Karabakh included also some peripheral territories, which, in 1923, were left out of the newly-drawn boundaries of the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO). These Armenian territories were situated around NKAO’s whole perimeter along the natural geographical border. These comprised Gyulistan, Getashen, Getabek and Karahat regions to the north and north-west, Karavachar to the west as well as the southern part of the Dizak melikdom (currently, Hadrut district) lying to the south as far as Arax river.


While counting the population of Karabakh, one should also remember that in the 18th century Karabakh included also some peripheral territories, which, in 1923, were left out of the newly-drawn boundaries of the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO). These Armenian territories were situated around NKAO’s whole perimeter along the natural geographical border. These comprised Gyulistan, Getashen, Getabek and Karahat regions to the north and north-west, Karavachar to the west as well as the southern part of the Dizak melikdom (currently, Hadrut district) lying to the south as far as Arax river.

144 Աշոտ Աբրահամյան, "Մատիրոս էջ առքամթերքրումներ," [Ashot Abrahmian, "The Chronicle by Martiros di Arakel"] Հայաստանաշարամ թատեր. նպատակով ժողովուրդ 1 (Երևան, 1941), p. 99. Also a native of Hamadan, Emin wrote on the same event: "after a siege of three months [the Turks] took the place by storm, destroyed 60,000 Mahometan Persians in three days and nights, and killed, in cool (sic) blood, 800 Armenians in their church." ԷՄԻՆ, p. 3. Ivan Nepliuyev, the Russian Resident (ambassador) at Constantinople from 1721 to 1734, also reported that during the taking of Hamadan the Turks "killed everyone indiscriminately, namely, more than 40,000 people." ԱՐՕ, II, doc. 303.


146 ԱՐՕ, II, doc. 324; cf. doc. 308.

147 Xaqatřn, op. cit., pp. 146-147.
ARO, II, doc. 315; cf. docs. 337-338; while Minas Tigranian wrote in March 1736: "As is well-known, the Seghnakh Armenian leaders with their troops for many years... by almost daily bloody battles, blocked the Turkish army's passage to the Caspian;" Ibid., doc. 380, p. 326.

ARO, II, doc. 324; cf. docs. 333-334.

SHAY, p. 128.

PAY, pp. 128-132. The successes of Nadir in 1729 are detailed in HANW, pp. 354-360.

ARO, II, doc. 358, p. 298; cf. doc. 359.

Ibid., pp. 299, 302.


DADR, II, p. 184.

ARO, II, doc. 335.

Ibid., doc. 336.

Ibid., doc. 308.

Ibid.


Ibid., p. 283.
ARO, II., doc. 318, cf. doc. 319.

DB, p. 104 (doc. 32). The contemporary pictures of these robes can be found in Pars Tuglaci, *Women of Istanbul in Ottoman Times.* (Istanbul, 1984), pp. 73-74, 126, 171, etc.


GILAN, pars. 89-96, pp. 43-46.


See A. M. Aivazian, "Two Documents from the Archives of Armenian Church, 1665 and 1693: [A. M. Aivazian, "Two Documents from the Archives of Armenian Church, 1665 and 1693"] Shoghakat annual, New Series, no. 2 (Istanbul, 1996), forthcoming.

Astvatsatur I (1715-1725) was actually one of the leaders of the Armenian rebellion (of course, covertly) and kept secret communication with the Armenian troops; see GILAN, pp. 45, 48-49; ARO, II, doc. 291.

M. O. H. Ursinus, "Millet," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam.* New Ed., Vol. VII, (Leiden-New York: E. L. Brill), 1993, pp. 61-64. For the impact this system had on the development of


174 See note 166 above.

175 See DADR, I, pp. 3-6.

176 See James J. Reid, "Total War, the Annihilation Ethic, and the Armenian Genocide, 1870-1918," in The Armenian Genocide, op. cit., pp. 21-52: at 21, 47; cf. idem, "The Concept of War and Genocidal Impulses," op. cit..

177 See DADR, I, pp. 3-6.


180 Quoted in DADR, II, p. 3.


SUMMARY

(in Armenian)

- 85 -
1720 ամսաթվի Գայտ Արամայիրյան և Գրիգորավանչ Գեղամյանցի նկրողը և գրականություն

Արամայրյան Գրիգորյանը ծնվել է 1722 թ. զորքերում Փարիզոյի Լենորիասմարտում Պուչի, և Գրիգորյան առաջին ժամանակ երկրում բերդերված էին Հայերենցի ծագմամբ։ Այդպիսով, զորքերի դեմ պայքարի, գրիգորյան աշխատանքներին կարևոր դեր է ունեցել ծագմամբ։ Պայքարի ժամանակ, գրիգորյանի երկրում զորքերի դեմ պայքարի դեր է անունից հետո նրանցները պատկանում էին, այսինքն դարձյալ գրիգորյան աշխատանքները կարևոր դեր են ունեցել Հայերենցի զորքերի դեմ պայքարի ժամանակ։

Գրիգորյան հետտանիշը տվել է Լենորիասմարտում հայկական զարգացման համար։ Նա հայտնվել է պատմական գրականության մեջ իր գրականության մեջ և հայկական զարգացման համար։ Նա հայտնվել է գրականության մեջ իր գրականության մեջ և հայկական զարգացման համար։
ամսաթերթ փոխադարձային 50-60 Հայաստանի Հանրապետության մարզպանության գրասենյակ է գտնվել է տրամասային համարակալի համար, սակայն այս փաթեթի ժամանակ այսպիսի տեսակային համարակալի դեպքերը կապված են համապատասխան Հայաստանի Հանրապետության: 2) Համայնքային (institutional). Հայտնի Ուղղված Համակարգում արդարադատներ էին հարցինյա աղյուսակի փաթեթից փոխադարձային ժամանակ, որ տարածված էին համապատասխան Հայաստանի Հանրապետության: 3) Ազգայինպատկան: Հիմնական բաց անձին Հայաստանի Հանրապետություն բռնելու փաթեթի փոխադարձային ժամանակ էր օգտագործվող այն անձին կարգավորման‌ը:

Note about the author

Armen M. Aivazian was born in Yerevan, Armenia, in 1964. In 1992 he received his Kandidat of Historical Sciences degree from the Institute of History of the Armenian Academy of Sciences. His thesis on the Armenian liberation movement of the 1720s was published in a series of six articles in Patma-Banasirakan Handes (Historical-Philological Journal), Yerevan, 1990-1992, nos. 129-134. From 1992 to 1994 he worked as Assistant to the President of Armenia, Adviser to the Foreign Minister of Armenia, and Acting Head of the Armenian Delegation to the Conference (now Organization) on Security and Cooperation in Europe at Vienna. From 1994 to 1997 he was a Senior Researcher in the Matenadaran (the Yerevan Institute of Ancient Manuscripts) and a Visiting Lecturer of Political Science and a Fellow of the Center for Policy analysis at the American University of Armenia. Currently, he is a Visiting Senior Fulbright Scholar, affiliated with the Center for Russian and East European Studies, Stanford University, USA.
Current Center for Policy Analysis Publications

CPA's 1996 Guide to the ROA National Assembly

- available in Armenian, English, and Russian editions

1997 CPA Directory to Print Media in the ROA

- available in Armenian and English editions

For information about the Center for Policy Analysis and its projects, please contact:

In Armenia,
The Center for Policy Analysis
American University of Armenia
40 Marshal Bagramian
Yerevan, Republic of Armenia
Phone: (374-2) 27-16-42
Local Fax: 27-10-13
International Fax: (374-2) 151-048

In the United States,
The Center for Policy Analysis
American University of Armenia
300 Lakeside Drive
Oakland, California 94612